A Replication and Extension of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes's (2011) Study of Induced Implicit Attitudes by Harvey, Douglas Miles
 
 
 
http://researchcommons.waikato.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the 
Act and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right 
to be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be 
made to the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
A Replication and Extension of Hughes and 
Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) 
Study of Induced Implicit Attitudes 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
Master of Applied Psychology (Behaviour Analysis) 
at 
The University of Waikato 
by 
Douglas Miles Harvey 
 
 
2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
Abstract 
In order to replicate Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) study, 12 
undergraduate students were presented with two novel stimuli (the words “Cug” and 
“Vek”) in one of three attitude-induction conditions. In the first condition, a training 
IRAP provided feedback that shaped the participants’ brief-and-immediate relational 
responding over multiple discrete trials. In the second condition, a written narrative 
presented the two potential attitude objects (the words “Cug” and “Vek”) as 
equivalent to a series of either positive or negative trait adjectives. In the third 
condition, participants were given both the training IRAP and the written narrative. 
Having completed the training phase, the participants then took a testing IRAP in 
which the words “Cug” and “Vek” were presented as being either “Similar” or 
“Opposite” to a range of verbal stimuli with either positive or negative connotations. 
As the results of Experiment 1 indicate, all three of the experimental manipulations 
generated differential relational responding, yet there was no repeat of the weakening 
in the ‘IRAP effects’ that was observed by Hughes and Barnes-Holmes. To find out if 
the engineered response biases persisted over a longer timescale than the 20 min it 
took to run the first testing IRAP, a second experiment was conducted in which the 
remaining participants (n = 11) retook the testing IRAP five days later (Experiment 
2a). The results of Experiment 2a indicate that the response biases that were 
engineered in the first session persisted into the second session; furthermore, there 
was a weakening of the ‘IRAP effects’ across the three pairs of test blocks in all of the 
attitude-induction conditions. To find out if the engineered response biases could be 
strengthened by further training, following the second testing IRAP (Experiment 2a), 
the participants were presented with the same attitude-induction procedure they had 
been given during Experiment 1; they were then asked to complete a third and final 
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testing IRAP (Experiment 2b). The results of Experiment 2b indicate that response 
biases can be strengthened through further training. However, the ‘IRAP effects’ 
recorded in Experiment 2b were broadly weaker than the ‘IRAP effects’ recorded in 
the other two experiments. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Literature Review 
 
1.1 Defining the Attitude Construct 
 
As a construct of interest to individuals working within a broad range of disciplines, 
‘attitude’ is a psychological phenomenon that has been conceptualised and defined in a 
variety of ways. For example, one definition is that an attitude is a cognitive evaluation of an 
environmental event (Albarracín, Zanna, Johnson, & Kumkale, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010) that may influence subsequent overt behaviour. Such 
evaluations occur whenever there is a stimulus (or attitude object; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) 
with which to interact; and given how complex human existence is, these evaluations may 
provide a short-cut to navigating the world at large (Albarracín et al., 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). Furthermore, these evaluations may be positive, negative, or neutral with each attitude 
existing on a spectrum from extremely positive to extremely negative (Albarracín et al., 
2005; Allport, 1935; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Olson & Kendrick, 
2008). The attitude object can be anything within the environment of an individual: an 
experimenter in a psychology lab, a person, something to be feared or desired, a complex 
sequence of events, or even a verbal stimulus presented within a written narrative.  
As with any psychological construct, there are many alternate definitions to the one 
most approached by researchers (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Attitudes are variously described 
as being either physical or mental postures that prepare an organism for later action (Allport, 
1935), a neurological change that alters how information is received in future (Warren, 1922, 
as cited in Allport, 1935), or a tendency to respond in a consistent way towards a particular 
stimulus (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This last definition assumes that such tendencies are 
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stored as dispositions acquired either during an individual’s unique learning history or by 
way of genetic inheritance (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; McGuire, 1985). Furthermore, this 
definition necessarily supposes that there is a hypothetical inner state which remains 
relatively stable over time despite the ongoing influence of novel learning situations (Hughes, 
Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). Yet, even though there has been some empirical 
support for the dispositional definition of the attitude construct, recent research has 
demonstrated that attitudes are more malleable than they were once thought to be (Cullen et 
al., 2009; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Ranganath & Nosek, 2006). 
Perhaps one of the most utilised interpretations of the attitude construct is the 
Tripartite or Multicomponent Model (Cacioppo, Petty, & Green, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Olson & Kendrick, 2008) which states that each attitude 
comprises elements of cognition, affect, and behaviour. Within the model, the cognitive 
component refers to what an individual thinks in regards to an attitude object (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Olson & Kendrick, 2008): such thoughts include 
what they believe and what attributes are ascribed to the object to be evaluated. An example 
of attitudinal cognition would be an individual believing that a person of another race is 
inherently good or bad in accordance with a particular personality trait that the observed 
person may or may not actually possess in reality. The affective component refers to how an 
individual feels about an attitude object, including the emotions that the object elicits and any 
typical autonomic arousal that occurs in the presence of the attitude object (Olson & 
Kendrick, 2008). An example of attitudinal affect would be the arousal resulting from the 
presence of a feared object such as a spider or a snake and the summated feelings and moods 
that are experienced as a result of the encounter. The behavioural component includes any 
past response that has occurred in the presence of the attitude object and how that past 
response informs momentary ‘online’ behaviour (Olson & Kendrick, 2008); this last 
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component also includes memories of past actions and possibly elements of classical 
conditioning (Olson & Fazio, 2001), habit, and automatic responding. The Multicomponent 
Model has long been used within social psychology (and even Greek and Hindu philosophy) 
to describe the three different manifestations of the attitude construct (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993). However, the model becomes problematic when the evaluative responses of each 
component are indistinguishable and heavily convergent (Chaiken & Eagly, 1993; Cacioppo 
et al., 1989; Maio & Haddock, 2010). Indeed, in some circumstances the various distinctions 
become almost arbitrary (as occurs when what a person thinks is the same as how they feel), 
indicating that there may an inherent redundancy to the Multicomponent Model (Cacioppo et 
al., 1989; Maio & Haddock, 2010). Furthermore, the attitude construct can be readily defined 
in purely behavioural terms without the need for any hypothetical secondary structures and 
components (as occurs within the functional interpretation of attitudinal behaviour; Hughes et 
al., 2011; Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & Vahey, 2012). 
Beyond considering evaluative responses in affective and behavioural terms, there has 
been much recent work on the cognitive component of the attitude construct. Indeed, since 
the cognitive “revolution” (Goldstein, 2011, p. 12) of the 1950s and 1960s, there have been a 
great many cognitive theories of the attitude construct and several theoretical attitude models 
that use the computer-processing metaphor prevalent within the cognitive perspective (Crano 
& Prislin, 2006). Such mentalistic interpretations of evaluative responding almost always 
require the use of either a hypothetical structure within which attitudinal cognition occurs or 
some form of cognitive mechanism which influences and instructs overt attitudinal behaviour 
(Hughes et al., 2011). These cognitive interpretations of the “essential architecture” (Hughes 
et al., 2011, p. 465) of the attitude construct are most often developed to explain evaluative 
responding that has been observed and recorded under controlled experimental conditions. 
Yet, as Hughes et al. (2011) and Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2013) assert, it is possible to 
 4 
 
interpret such overt evaluative behaviour without resorting to the use of suppositional mental 
structures and processes. Furthermore, as all psychological research begins with the recording 
of observable behaviour anyway, the construction of secondary hypothetical constructs 
appears to complicate what is essentially just the observation and description of context-
dependent evaluative behaviour. Indeed, it is the added complexity that is answered by the 
inherent parsimony of the behaviour-analytic interpretation of the attitude construct; within 
this interpretation, attitudinal responses are analysed to find out, not so much how they 
happen, but simply why they occur at a certain point in time and within a certain environment 
(Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012). 
As is evident from what has just been discussed, how the construct is conceptualised 
influences entirely how one describes, explains, and researches attitudinal behaviour (Hughes 
et al., 2011). For example, if one conceptualises ‘attitude’ in solely functional terms (Hughes 
et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012) then there is no need to consider whether or not there are 
any cognitive elements involved in the evaluative process as they do not add value to the 
interpretation. Rather, the focus of inquiry would be on why the evaluative behaviour 
happens, what it achieves for the individual who is doing the evaluating, and under what 
contextual conditions the behaviour is performed (so that it can be predicted and possibly 
influenced; Biglan & Hayes, 1996). 
 
1.2 The Two Types of Evaluation and Explicit Attitudes 
 
Allport (1935) noted that an individual can hold more than one attitude towards a 
particular object or event and described such multiple evaluations as thinking one thing and 
saying something else. The evaluative duplicity Allport describes perhaps occurs because an 
individual readily knows how they should or should not respond to something despite their 
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‘gut-feeling’ telling them something different (Hughes et al., 2011; Olson & Fazio, 2001). 
Furthermore, a person’s ‘gut feeling’ (Olson & Fazio, 2001) is not as readily accessible as the 
opinions or beliefs they express knowingly and overtly, a situation which requires 
contemporary attitude researchers to measure inaccessible attitudes through indirect means 
and the more accessible evaluations through direct questioning (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Nosek, 2007). In some circumstances, these two approaches to measuring attitudes produce 
contradictory results when used within the same experimental context (Barnes-Holmes, 
Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, & Boles, 2010). As a result, there has been speculation as to how 
the attitude ‘structure’ promotes seemingly multiple evaluations under certain circumstances 
(McGuire, 1985). There has also been an attempt made by those working within behaviour 
analysis to explain in purely functional terms the way an individual can hold more than one 
attitude to an object at any one time (Barnes-Holmes, Murphy, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 
2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012). 
The contradiction between how people respond openly to an object and how they may 
respond to that same object when unaware of what is being asked of them may occur because 
in the process of evaluating something there are actually two types of attitude at play. Indeed, 
one of the principal distinctions made within mainstream attitude research is between 
evaluations that are explicit and those that are implicit (Nosek, 2007). The former type of 
attitude occurs deliberately and knowingly (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Payne & 
Gawronski, 2010), in a way that requires cognitive processing while the latter type occurs 
automatically with little cognitive effort (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2011; Payne & Gawronski, 2010); and because explicit attitudes operate only within 
consciousness and implicit attitudes occur solely without it, it is possible to hold two 
simultaneous attitudes to an object or event (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). In 
Allport’s (1935) assertion that each individual possesses two sets of attitudes, one public and 
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one private, there is the assumption that both types of evaluation are readily accessible. 
However, as a large body of research has shown, there are at least two types of evaluation 
and attitudes can be defined as being either explicit or implicit depending on whether or not 
they are accessed with conscious intent. Simply put, explicit attitudes are those that are 
readily accessible, self-reportable, and deliberate (Hughes et al., 2011; Nosek, 2007), and 
implicit attitudes are inaccessible, automatic, and unconscious (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; 
Payne & Gawronski, 2010). 
Explicit attitudes are cognitive evaluations that occur within specific contexts and in 
response to a demand situation in which controlled deliberation can occur. As Krosnick, 
Judd, and Wittenbrink (2005) explain, explicit attitudes are activated only when there is the 
required motivation to engage in controlled and deliberate evaluating and there are the 
cognitive resources available at that particular moment. In other words, an explicit evaluation 
takes place when an individual has the cognitive capacity to engage in the evaluative process 
and the innate need (or even ‘desire’) to do so (Krosnick et al., 2005). This dynamic may also 
be mirrored in the way explicit attitudes are formed, with such evaluations occurring in a 
context in which cognitive effort is able to be expended on the evaluative process and 
deliberate conscious judgements are engaged in (Bassili & Brown, 2005). Furthermore, 
explicit attitudes may be a by-product of ‘socialisation’ (Devos, 2008; Olson & Kendrick, 
2008), which is the ever-present social interaction that occurs whenever an individual states 
an opinion that is received, processed, and reinforced by another individual who is then 
reinforced for their response to the original statement. An example of an explicit evaluation 
in such a socialisation process would be when a father tells his disinterested son which sports 
team he thinks will win an upcoming tournament. If the son believes that his father is a good 
predictor of future sporting outcomes, or if he has no better source of knowledge on the 
matter, or if he does not want to risk annoying his father, he may agree to the proffered 
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attitude in a process that is motivated, deliberate, controlled, and (as is the case with all social 
interactions) requiring of a certain amount of available cognitive resources. If the son is 
distracted or momentarily required to use his cognitive resources for another task, he may 
offer a more implicit attitude such as “I don’t care about sports”. Accordingly, it is evident 
that much social cognition involves the activation and expression of explicit attitudes. Indeed, 
many, if not all, explicit evaluative responses occur within some form of social interaction, be 
it the answering of a spoken request, the reading of an email, or the circling of a number on a 
Likert scale in response to a series of written instructions. 
There are multiple theories as to how explicit attitudes are acquired. As Hughes et al. 
(2011) assert, explicit attitudes may be generated as a consequence of receiving new 
knowledge in the guise of information related to the immediate context. It is also possible that 
explicit attitudes are the behavioural products of cognitive reasoning that contains verbal 
rules (or propositions) activated within conscious awareness in an intentional way (Hughes et 
al., 2011; Olson & Kendrick, 2008). Furthermore, some theorists believe that explicit 
attitudes are actually evidence of an enduring predisposition to respond to a stimulus in a 
certain way and that the momentary context serves to only influence evaluative responding in 
a manner that disrupts the influence of the underlying disposition (Hughes et al., 2011). In the 
purely functional perspective that behaviour analysts work within, explicit attitudes are 
behavioural events which occur in response to stimuli operating within a specific 
environmental context (which can be the presence of a person, the spoken request for an 
opinion on a certain subject, or the reading of a written request for a response on a self-report 
measure). As such, explicit attitudes are not the manifestation of a stable disposition (Hughes 
et al., 2011) but an ever-changing ‘act-in-context’ (Biglan & Hayes, 1996; Hughes et al., 
2012) with no intentional, conscious, and deliberate evaluation of an attitude object ever 
being the same as another evaluation. 
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1.2.1 ‘Direct’ Measures of Explicit Attitudes 
 
The measurement of attitudes occurs whenever there is an attempt to quantify an 
individual’s evaluation of stimuli within their environment (Albarracín et al., 2005). Yet, 
being an unobservable psychological construct, an attitude is something that can only be 
inferred from overt behaviour, which in the ‘direct’ (De Houwer, 2006a, as cited in Hughes et 
al., 2011) measurement of explicit attitudes involves first asking an individual how they 
evaluate a stimulus and then interpreting just what that evaluation means in the context 
(Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). The ‘directness’ of the measurement is due to the absence of any 
non-social response-pressure on the behavioural system (such as the need to respond quickly 
or in contradiction to a learned rule) which would require automatic and uncontrolled 
responding (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In other words, within a ‘direct’ measurement 
approach, any request for an evaluation is directly stated and then answered directly. 
Considered en masse, ‘direct’ methods measure explicit attitudes because the individual is 
able to provide a deliberate and controlled response to the demand that is placed upon them. 
However, the ‘direct’ measurement of explicit attitudes presents some very serious threats to 
internal validity. For example, asking someone what their attitude is to something produces a 
behavioural outcome, be it a mark on a visual scale, the production of a series of synonyms in 
response to a verbal stimulus, or the circling of an individual digit within a series of numbers; 
yet, it is possible that these permanent products do not so much describe the true attitude at 
play as the socially mediated attitude that should be at play (Allport, 1935; Hughes et al., 
2011). 
The first self-report measures were designed during the initial flourishing of attitude 
research in the 1920s and 1930s (McGuire, 1985). These early ‘direct’ measures involved 
researchers presenting individuals with a large volume of questions that were selected to 
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access the attitude of interest (Krosnick et al., 2005). Indeed, as Allport (1935) reports, it was 
not unheard of for a questionnaire in the 1930s to include literally hundreds of questions. 
Such lengthy tests have been phased out over time in favour of single-question surveys 
(Krosnick et al, 2005) and tests involving the method first used by Likert (Allport, 1935). 
Single-question surveys involve visual measures such as meaningfulness scales, semantic-
differential scales, and feeling thermometers (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Maio & 
Haddock, 2010), along with ‘direct’ questions in which an individual is asked to offer an 
explicit evaluation of a written stimuli. Likert scales present an individual with a series of 
opinion statements with the requirement being that they indicate how much they agree or 
disagree with the statement by selecting where on a 5-point scale their attitude lies (from 
strongly disagree through to strongly agree with a neutral value in third place on the scale; 
Allport, 1935; Maio & Haddock, 2010). 
 
1.2.2 The Complexity of Measuring Explicit Attitudes 
 
For a psychometric measure to be both valid and reliable it must consistently and 
accurately measure what it is developed and deployed to measure. Yet, as Hughes et al. 
(2011) report, a measure of explicit attitudes may not measure the attitude itself but the 
attitude plus some other inexplicable and unavoidable value. Furthermore, there is possibly 
an inherent inaccuracy in how an individual reports on their own introspectively accessed 
thoughts and feelings (Hughes et al., 2011), with the immediate context undermining what 
would otherwise be a fairly ‘pure’ private event. As Krosnick et al. (2005) state, there are 
many theorists who believe that attitudes are momentary constructions that only exist at the 
point in time in which the attitude is expressed; and this constructivist perspective is echoed 
by the “context dependency” (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, p. 17) inherent in the interpretation 
 10 
 
of evaluative behaviour offered by behaviour analysts and others working in accordance with 
the assumptions of functional contextualism (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 
2011; Hughes et al., 2012). So, rather than seek to address the extraneous variables inherent 
in explicit attitude testing (a task made near-impossible by the unobservable nature of such 
additional ‘noise’), it may be best to merely accept them as a necessary part of the 
experimental transaction. In other words, the attitude is the evaluation plus the context 
(Krosnick et al., 2005; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001) and any other extraneous variables 
associated with the flaws that accompany the introspective process. 
Perhaps one of the most commented on aspects of the measurement of explicit 
attitudes is whether or not an individual alters (either knowingly or unknowingly) their 
behavioural response to create a more favourable social outcome. Such biased responding has 
been labelled impression management, desirability bias, and “[strategic] self-presentation” 
(Hughes et al., 2011, p. 466). In addition to such desirability and demand biases (Hughes et 
al., 2011; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007), there are other ways in which an individual’s 
evaluations may be momentarily aberrant or out-of-character. In evaluating an attitude object, 
an individual may cognitively attend to only a certain aspect of the object in a manner that 
could influence their subsequent response (Schwarz, 2008; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001). For 
example, an individual could momentarily think of a solitary poor feature when asked to 
judge the design quality of a car that they otherwise like the look of. Alternatively, an 
individual may recall an episode of their past behaviour towards an attitude object that was 
anomalous or out-of-character (thus altering their current attitude), and they may attend to 
their past emotional and physiological responses to an attitude object in a manner that 
influences their momentary emotional and physiological state (and hence their ‘online’ 
evaluating of the object). Furthermore, and in a way that reflects the self-editing that occurs 
in impression management and demand-responding (Hughes et al., 2011), having decided on 
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what their explicit evaluation of an attitude object is, an individual may then alter their 
answer to best suit the context that the original question was asked in (Schwarz & Bohner, 
2001). 
It is common practice to label the methodologies intended to access explicit attitudes 
‘direct’ measures (Hughes et al., 2011). But in determining what an individual’s controlled 
and deliberate evaluation of an attitude object is, the presence of the explicit attitude can only 
be inferred from the behavioural outcome that occurs in response to the demand that is placed 
on the individual (Krosnick et al., 2005). When it comes to behaviours that occur in response 
to a multitude of contextual elements, the inference becomes a complicated and elaborate 
process. Therefore, it is reasonable to assert that, when it comes to attitude-testing, there is – 
in actuality – no such thing as a ‘direct’ measurement procedure (Krosnick et al., 2005) and 
that any form of self-report is contaminated by both the individual’s inability to truly access 
how they evaluate an attitude object and the very context in which the question is asked and 
the answer is given. There is also a methodological complexity in using ‘direct’ measures to 
access an individual’s explicit evaluation of an attitude object. As Schwarz (2008) and 
Schwarz and Bohner (2001) assert, having been presented with a self-report measure that 
uses a rating scale (such as a Likert system or a semantic-differential scale), an individual 
must first interpret the scale before stating what they believe their opinion is. They must then 
place that evaluation within the particular scaling system used (which is potentially a further 
point of pollution in the recording of the attitude). Furthermore, there may also be an added 
layer of complexity when written or spoken instructions are used with some ‘direct’ measures 
of explicit attitudes. For example, the use of semantic differential scales may be fairly self-
explanatory to many experimental participants (they do after all contain a rating scale set 
between two clearly oppositional terms; Himmelfarb, 1993). However, being a (possibly 
anachronistic) metaphor, feeling thermometers require an additional level of thought to the 
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already increased cognitive processing required to answer the demand. Similarly, 
meaningfulness scales require secondary and tertiary evaluations regarding what it means to 
be ‘meaningful’ and whether or not the introspectively accessed attitude could be described 
as such. 
So, in order to control for the “context dependency” (Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, P. 17) 
of the behavioural outcomes and to mitigate any impression management, social desirability, 
demand confusion, and methodological noise from the measurement of attitudes, researchers 
have recently turned to more ‘indirect’ measures (as was recommended by Allport in 1935). 
 
1.3 Implicit Attitudes 
 
Since the work of Freud in the early 20th century there has been an interest within 
psychological science with the ‘unconscious’ and what social psychologists often label as 
“implicit social cognition” (Payne & Gawronski, 2010, p. 2). However, it was during the 
flourishing of attitude research in the 1980s that the discourse began to focus on the 
contextual and cognitive conditions that produce implicit attitudes and those that produce 
more explicit evaluations (Payne & Gawronski, 2010). As Krosnick et al. (2005) summarise, 
implicit attitudes may exist when the occurrence of an environmental event (the “attitude 
object”, p. 24), or a symbolic representation of that event, gives rise to a spontaneous and 
automatic judgement that takes place quickly and with little cognitive ‘effort’. Because much 
of the research into attitudinal cognition is predicated on the existence of mental structures, it 
is commonly presupposed that implicit attitudes are stored in either long-term memory or 
within some other hypothetical mental compound (Amodio & Ratner, 2011; Krosnick et al., 
2005). Furthermore, it has been postulated that such attitudes occur as a result of an 
associative process within that cognitive store (Fazio, 2007; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
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2011). In other words, when an individual is exposed to a particular stimulus, the presence of 
the stimulus (or attitude object) may activate the mental representation of itself and the 
mental representations of other stimuli with similar physical, verbal, or even arbitrary 
characteristics (as perceived by the individual) and/or spatial or temporal proximity to the 
initial stimuli within the environment (Hughes et al., 2011). It is in this association of one 
stimulus with another stimulus that evaluations are made (such as a picture of a spider 
activating the verbal stimulus scary). As Hughes et al. (2011) assert, within this cognitive 
reading of the attitude construct, implicit attitudes are different from explicit evaluations in 
the way in which they are retained: put simply, explicit attitudes exist as mental propositions 
that require intentional and deliberate processing whereas implicit attitudes exist as 
associations which are activated with little cognitive effort or conscious awareness (Hughes 
et al., 2011). 
Four possible sources of implicit attitudes are traditionally postulated to be: the events 
of early childhood, past affective responses to specific events, the individual’s culture, and 
the individual’s need to evaluate events in a way that is consistent with what they otherwise 
think and believe (Olsen & Kendrick, 2004; Rudman, 2004). The first source of implicit 
attitudes refers to the evaluations that are gained during the observation of the environment 
that occurs before an individual is able to form, consolidate, and recall memories (Olson & 
Kendrick, 2008; Rudman, 2004). The second (affective) source refers automatic evaluations 
that are related to increased activation of the amygdalae (which are two groups of nuclei in 
the brain that are associated with affect and emotion; Olson & Kendrick, 2008). The third 
source references the myriad biased learning opportunities that occur within the ongoing 
socialisation process an individual experiences throughout the lifespan (Olson & Kendrick, 
2008; Rudman, 2004). The final source focuses upon the hypothetical need an individual has 
to associate environmental events in a manner that is consistent with what has been learnt in 
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the past (Olson & Kendrick, 2008; Rudman, 2004). 
According to a behaviour-analytic interpretation of implicit cognition, implicit 
attitudes are behavioural events that involve the cognitive-behavioural process of arbitrarily-
applicable relational responding (Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001; Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, Hughes et al., 2011, Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Within this interpretation, 
implicit evaluations are “brief and immediate relational responses” (BIRRs; Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013, p. 102) in which two or more stimuli are placed within relational 
frames (such as frames of co-ordination, frames of opposition, or even just frames of 
difference; Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Furthermore, within the 
demand characteristics of the contexts that promote automatic and unconscious evaluative 
responding, there is little opportunity for an individual to elaborate on such simple relational 
frames, so there is meagre opportunity for the type of arbitrarily-applicable relational 
responding that is traditionally known as impression management or desirability bias 
(Hughes et al., 2011). Indeed, regardless of the specific procedures used, one of the defining 
characteristics of the implicit attitude measures that belong to the recent methodological 
“revolution” (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, p. 100) is their inbuilt ability to nullify 
controlled and deliberate responding. Accordingly, the overwhelming majority of ‘indirect’ 
measures of implicit attitudes tend to create the conditions for brief-and-immediate responses 
to occur at the expense of more elaborated evaluative behaviour (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013). 
 
1.3.1 ‘Indirect’ Measures of Implicit Attitudes 
 
As Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006) report, increasing focus on inaccessible, uncontrolled, 
and unconscious cognition has been accompanied by a vast amount of research to develop 
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measures that produce data from which the presence of ‘concealed’ evaluations can be 
inferred. Among some of these new methodologies are the Extrinsic Effective Simon Task 
(De Houwer, 2003), the Go/No-go Association Task (Nosek & Banaji, 2001), the Affect 
Misattribution Procedure (Payne & Lundberg, 2014), the Implicit Association Test (IAT; 
Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998), the various procedures that use evaluative and 
semantic priming (Krosnick et al., 2005; Wittenbrink, 2007; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007), 
and a range of techniques that involve the measurement of physiological or neurological 
activity (such as galvanic skin responses and event-related potentials) following an 
individual’s exposure to a stimulus (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2008; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
Despite the heterogeneous nature of implicit-attitude measures, there are several core 
similarities. For example, implicit-attitude measures tend to be delivered to participants using 
a computer-based testing programme; they often involve measuring response latency as the 
key dependent variable; they commonly involve a forced-choice scenario (such as having to 
decide whether to press one computer key instead of another; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007); 
and they may contain an element of distraction or false demand in order to obscure the 
demand characteristics of the particular test (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). The most widely 
used procedures are the semantic and evaluative priming techniques and the IAT. 
An evaluative priming task involves the on-screen presentation of a verbal stimulus to 
a participant who then presses either a key that signifies “good” or a key that signifies “bad”. 
The ‘strength’ of an implicit attitude is then inferred from the time taken for the individual to 
respond to the presented stimulus (Fazio, 1990; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2007). 
This inference is made on the assumption that there is a correspondence within the 
individual’s memory between the attitude object (the stimulus presented on-screen) and some 
form of stored evaluation, and that this correspondence makes the evaluation easier to access 
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when the object is first presented as a priming stimulus (Wittenbrink, 2007). So, the faster the 
response time, the greater the inferred association between the evaluation and the attitude 
object and hence the stronger the individual’s attitude towards that same object. 
A common extension to evaluative priming involves the momentary on-screen 
presentation of a stimulus just before a verbal evaluation is shown (in the form of an adjective 
such as “good”, “friendly”, or “horrible”). The individual is then required to state (by 
pressing a set key on a computer keyboard) whether the verbal evaluation is positive or 
negative (Maio & Haddock, 2010; Wittenbrink, 2007). As with the original version of the 
test, the computer programme records the time it takes for the test-user to respond to each 
verbal evaluation. Furthermore, if the stimulus presented before the verbal evaluation is 
considered implicitly by the individual to be in agreement with the evaluation then their 
response time should be faster than if the opposite were true (Maio & Haddock, 2010; 
Wittenbrink, 2007). In this way, the stimulus presented before the evaluation acts as a prime 
for what follows it; accordingly, this variation on the original procedure is called a semantic 
priming task because the meaning and quality of one stimulus prepares the participant for 
responding to the meaning and quality of another stimulus (Maio & Haddock, 2010; 
Wittenbrink, 2007). 
The IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007) is also a 
computer-based assessment procedure in which response latency is the primary dependent 
variable. A typical IAT procedure will involve a series of trial blocks (Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Lane et al., 2007; Maio & Haddock, 2010) with a specific rule operating within each block. 
In each discrete trial, the participant is presented with a stimulus on a computer screen and is 
asked to press one of two keys on a keyboard using a single finger on either hand (such as 
pressing the “d” key with the left middle finger and the “k” key with the right middle finger). 
The computer programme records the time taken for the participant to respond, with the key 
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assumption being that faster response times indicate the presence of stronger mental 
associations and hence stronger implicit attitudes (Lane et al., 2007; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 
2007). So in essence, the IAT involves asking the test-user to emit a certain response for a 
particular class of stimuli and another response for a second class of stimuli with the primary 
outcome measure being the speed of the differential responding that occurs (Greenwald et al, 
1998; Lane et al., 2007). 
The IAT procedure was a direct precursor to the Implicit Relational Assessment 
Procedure (IRAP; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011), the ‘indirect’ measure used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 of my research project. The need for accurate and fast responding 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Maio & Haddock, 2010), and the way in which differential 
responding is both promoted and recorded, are qualities shared by both procedures. But, as 
Barnes-Holmes et al. (2006), Chan, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, and Stewart (2009), and 
Hughes et al. (2011) assert, the IRAP measures attitudinal cognition in non-associative (and 
functional) terms whereas the IAT relies entirely upon the assumption that implicit attitudes 
are actually associative cognitive events. 
As will be argued, behaviour-analytic implicit-attitude measures tend to be fairly 
similar in appearance to the mainstream techniques. For example, they often involve the 
presentation of verbal stimuli on a computer screen while participants make a forced choice 
between two or more options. However, the theoretical and philosophical assumptions that 
guide behaviour-analytic research methods are markedly different to those that direct the 
most common implicit-attitude measures. For example, behaviour analysts believe that all 
cognition is behaviour, which means that attitudes, whether explicit or implicit, need to be 
considered as types of behaviour in and of themselves and not just behavioural manifestations 
of a multi-component mentalistic construct (Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the effects recorded by the aforementioned associative or priming methods can 
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be explained in behaviour-analytic terms using solely behavioural principles (such as the 
arbitrarily-applicable relational responding of Relational Frame Theory; Hayes et al., 2001; 
Gross & Fox, 2009). Indeed, the inherent scope of the behaviour-analytic interpretation of 
attitudes means that it can readily describe and explain attitudinal behaviour performed under 
a broad range of experimental conditions, even when those conditions have been designed 
and implemented in non-behaviour-analytic terms. 
 
1.3.2 The Complexity of Measuring Implicit Attitudes 
 
‘Indirect’ measures of implicit attitudes have been offered as the solution to the issue 
of the context influencing explicit evaluations to the point that the ‘true’ attitude becomes 
hard to determine (Schwarz, 2008; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
By accessing an unconscious and uncontrolled attitude in a way that does not allow for 
intentional deliberation and context perception, the vast majority of implicit attitude measures 
appear to reduce the extraneous ‘noise’ associated with the context-bound recording of 
attitudinal behaviour. As Hughes et al. (2011) and Wittenbrink and Schwarz (2007) assert, 
one such source of extraneous noise is the self-editing that an individual frequently (if not 
always) does when asked to express an attitude within a social interaction. ‘Indirect’ 
measures address this confounding variable by denying the individual a chance to self-edit 
through the use of either response-time limits or some form of procedural distraction. 
However, it must then be assumed that automatic responding is not also under the same 
control of the momentary context albeit in an inaccessible and unconscious way. As Schwarz 
(2008) states, there is some evidence that implicit attitudes are not free from contextual 
influence, in that environmental manipulations alter not only explicit attitudinal responding 
but also the expression of implicit attitudes. 
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In the same way that ‘direct’ measures of explicit attitudes produce ambiguous data 
that require interpretation, ‘indirect’ measures of implicit attitudes produce data that require a 
level of translation before any significant meaning can be ascribed to them. Even then, such 
an inference is merely that, a hypothetical reading of an attitude-behaviour relationship that is 
entirely unobservable. In other words, ‘indirect’ measures may evoke responding that is 
relatively free from social desirability bias and any other form of context-dependent 
impression management (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007), but the responding evoked by 
‘indirect’ measures cannot automatically be considered a proxy for whatever implicit 
attitudes an individual holds. So, in the same way that explicit, self-reported attitudes may not 
be what say they are, automatic and unconscious implicit attitudes (as inferred from 
quantitative data) may not be as readily apparent as they appear. An example of this 
ambiguity is the data produced by the IAT, in which it is assumed that shorter response times 
indicate stronger associations and hence stronger attitudes (Greenwald et al, 1998; Lane et al., 
2007; Maio & Haddock, 2010). Yet does response latency truly represent the strength of 
stored associations? Furthermore, do such stored associations (if they exist) represent 
attitudes held towards objects? As there have been no answers to these questions from within 
the discourse, there are some researchers and theoreticians who believe that ‘indirect’ 
measures evoke evaluations and that these evaluations (or attitudes) are a form of behaviour 
in their own right (Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012), and it is this functional 
interpretation of the attitude construct that guides my research project. 
A further issue regarding the use of ‘indirect’ procedures is whether or not they are 
suitably reliable and valid tools for measuring implicit attitudes and cognition. As Maio and 
Haddock (2010) report, a measure’s reliability depends on how accurately it records what it is 
designed to record. Two key measures of reliability are test-retest reliability and internal 
consistency (Coolican, 2009; Golijani-Moghaddam, Hart, & Dawson, 2013; Maio & 
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Haddock, 2010). The former measures whether an assessment technique produces the same 
data when used to measure the same behaviour administered on repeated occasions 
(Coolican, 2009), the latter whether or not it consistently records what it is supposed to 
record within a single application (Coolican, 2009). As Golijani-Moghaddam et al. (2013) 
report, the reliability of ‘indirect’ measures of implicit attitudes tends to be lower than more 
‘direct’ methodologies (with the IRAP – my research project’s featured methodology – 
comparing favourably to some of the other implicit-attitude measures; Golijani-Moghaddam 
et al., 2013). 
A measure’s validity can be established by determining if its content is appropriate for 
what is being tested, whether it compares well with a pre-existing measure of the same 
construct, how well it predicts future behavioural outcomes, and whether or not it appears to 
measure what it has been designed to measure (Coolican, 2009; Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 
2013). The IRAP has been found to be moderately valid in some of the aforementioned 
validity domains (Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is only through the 
experimental reiteration of ‘indirect’ methodologies that their validity and reliability can be 
tested, which is why replication and extension experiments (of the kind featured in my thesis) 
are useful to any scientific discourse. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Models of Attitudes 
 
As was mentioned within the earlier discussion of attitude definitions, one of the most 
referenced theoretical models of attitudes is the Multicomponent or Tripartite Model (Eagly 
& Chaiken, 1993; Maio & Haddock, 2010; Olson & Kendrick, 2008; Zanna & Rempel, 
1988). Within this model, attitudes are postulated to be summative evaluations comprised of 
cognitive, behavioural, and affective elements (Maio & Haddock, 2010; Olson & Kendrick, 
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2008). The cognitive component of an attitude involves any beliefs held about an attitude 
object; these beliefs contain learned attributions in which a positive or negative (or neutral) 
quality is ascribed to something that has been encountered in the environment. The 
behavioural component refers to how past behaviour influences present responding: for 
example, an individual is more likely to behave in a positive or negative way towards an 
attitude object if they have behaved in a positive or negative way to that object in the past 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Kendrick, 2008). The affective component of an attitude 
includes any emotional responses or autonomic arousal experienced in the actual or imagined 
presence of an attitude object and the feelings that those responses evoke. As Hughes et al. 
(2011) assert, these three elements may be summated into an evaluation that is positive or 
negative and in turn influences future behaviour towards the attitude object. Furthermore, the 
summated evaluation can be of any strength (Hughes et al., 2011). 
The Multicomponent Model makes intuitive sense. Indeed, it balances the three core 
activities that define the lived experience: what one thinks, what one feels, and what one does. 
However, one possible limitation of the Multicomponent Model is the potential absence of 
any substantive differences between any of the three elements (Maio & Haddock, 2010). 
What a person thinks is arguably what they feel and thinking and feeling are both examples of 
how one behaves (at least within a radical behaviourist worldview). 
One further limitation to the Tripartite or Multicomponent Model is that although it 
offers an accessible and useful description of what attitudes comprise, it does not account for 
the different behaviours that sometimes occur when an individual’s evaluation of an attitude 
object is tested both ‘directly’ and ‘indirectly’. Furthermore, the model does not address the 
way in which implicit and explicit evaluations each predict future behaviour in some contexts 
and not others (Devos, 2008). In some settings, an implicit-attitude measure accurately 
predicts future overt responding towards an attitude object whereas a ‘direct’ measure does 
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not (Hughes et al., 2011). Conversely, ‘direct’ measures sometimes better predict later 
behaviour than the currently used ‘indirect’ measures (Hughes et al., 2011). 
To explain the way in which implicit and explicit attitudes sometimes disagree and 
how these two types of evaluation differently influence later responding, some theorists have 
proposed that implicit and explicit attitudes are two types of discretely stored and heavily 
stable mental disposition held simultaneously towards an attitude object (Hughes et al., 
2011). Within this perspective, attitudes are fixed evaluations that are both persistent and 
resistant to changing circumstances. The dispositional perspective has been given empirical 
support by studies that have demonstrated the rigidity of implicit evaluations (Gregg, Seibt, 
& Banaji, 2006; Hughes et al., 2011). However, a good deal of recent research has 
demonstrated that rather than being stable dispositions, both implicit and explicit attitudes are 
malleable evaluations that are sensitive to changes in context (Gregg et al., 2006; Ranganath 
& Nosek, 2006), a notion that makes logical sense when one considers the ongoing need the 
human organism has to appraise the environment in a relevant and workable way (Albarracín 
et al., 2005). Accordingly, there is growing support for a more constructivist perspective in 
which attitudes are considered to be ‘online’ associative responses that occur within specific 
contexts (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006; Hughes et al., 2011). 
Regardless of whether attitudes are resistant to change or highly malleable 
evaluations, the aforementioned models do little to explain the cognitive processing that may 
or may not occur when an individual is required to evaluate an environmental event 
(Albarracín et al., 2005). Accordingly, single- and dual-process models have been offered to 
describe and explain in cognitive terms what may be happening during an implicit or explicit 
evaluation (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Hughes et al., 2011; Maio & Haddock, 2010). The single-
attitude model is predicated on the assumption that all attitudes use a single piece of 
environmental information which can even be an element of the attitude object itself 
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(Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999). However, rather than being simple evaluations that occur in 
consistent ways, implicit and explicit attitudinal responses appear to require different levels 
of motivation and opportunity (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Fazio, 1990a, as cited in Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 2005; Hughes et al., 2011; Krosnick et al., 2005). When a motivated individual is 
able to make a deliberate and controlled evaluation they will do so; but if the same individual 
is not motivated to evaluate something or is presented with the need to respond quickly, their 
evaluation will be automatic and unconsidered (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005; Bassili & Brown, 
2005). Dual-process models address this issue by assuming two discrete processes in implicit 
and explicit evaluative cognition (Crano & Prislin, 2006; Hughes et al., 2011; Maio & 
Haddock, 2010), with associative processing responsible for implicit cognition and 
propositional processing responsible for explicit cognition. Associative cognition involves the 
activation of a further stimulus (or network of stimuli) in response to an environmental event 
whereas propositional cognition involves the controlled and conscious deliberation of verbal 
rules (or propositions; Hughes et al., 2011). 
A principle issue with the vast majority of cognitivist attitude models is that they 
assume a broad array of mental structures and processes that cannot be observed or measured, 
only inferred (Hughes et al., 2011; Uttal, 2000). Accordingly, there is an alternative 
interpretation that is gaining support within behaviour analysis in which a more functional 
(and parsimonious) approach to the attitude construct is offered. Within this interpretation, 
attitudes are cognitive-behavioural events called arbitrarily-applicable relational responses 
(Gross & Fox, 2009; Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes et al., 
2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011) in which a verbal representation of an attitude object 
is placed within a relational frame with one or more other stimuli. As I will discuss, 
arbitrarily-applicable relational responding can be used to explain both attitudinal behaviour 
and the discrepancies that occur when evaluations of the same attitude object are captured by 
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‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methodologies (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). 
 
1.5 Attitudes as Behaviour 
 
This discussion has predominantly presented attitudes as evaluative episodes of 
implicit or explicit cognition that may or may not feature affective and behavioural 
components (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Olson & Kendrick, 2008; Maio & Haddock, 2010). 
These evaluative events have been at times described and understood using hypothetical 
mental structures and processes (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes 2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013, Uttal, 2000). However, attitudes may also be considered as entirely behavioural events 
using a purely functional approach in accordance with the assumptions of functional 
contextualism (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et 
al., 2012).The fundamental goal of the functional approach is to understand, predict, and 
influence behaviour with scope (explaining as many behaviours occurring within as many 
contexts as possible), precision (using a limited series of principles to explain a particular 
behaviour), and depth (applying a single interpretation across a range of disciplines and 
multiple levels of analysis from discrete behavioural events to the most extended patterns of 
responding). The application of this tripartite goal to the comparison of a ‘typical’ cognitive 
theory of attitudes and a more functional interpretation will often reveal a disparity between 
the two types of approach, with the cognitive interpretation being able to describe and explain 
(using hypothetical mental structures and processes) a specific aspect of the attitude construct 
with great precision whilst simultaneously being unable to adequately describe and explain 
other aspects of the construct or the same aspect within a different context (as is the case 
when a ‘mentalistic’ model is unable to account for the differential responding that occurs 
when both ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ measures are used to capture the same evaluation); 
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conversely, the functional interpretation may describe and explain (using broad behavioural 
principles) what occurs when an individual is engaged in evaluative cognition and behaviour 
in a way that allows for the analysis to be generalised to a seemingly limitless range of 
contexts (Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2011). Additionally, the cognitivist interpretation 
may not have the predictive power that the functional approach has, meaning that it is 
difficult to suppose the nature of future responding from a cognitive model or theory alone. 
Furthermore, the cognitivist interpretation requires the creation of a complex system of 
assumptions and inferences to describe and explain attitudinal behaviour (Hughes et al., 
2011; Uttal, 2000) whereas the more pragmatic functional approach would simply analyse 
what it is that these evaluations achieve (Hughes et al., 2011). Indeed, the inherent 
pragmatism of the functional interpretation of attitudes directly counters the complexity of 
the hypothetical mental structures that are postulated to mediate both private evaluations and 
subsequent overt behaviour in the more ‘mentalistic’ interpretations (Hughes et al., 2012; 
Uttal, 2000). 
Relational Frame Theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001) provides one way to define 
attitudes in behavioural terms (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). RFT explains how an individual may evaluate an 
attitude object in a positive or negative way. RFT also accounts for the way individuals form 
attitudes to objects, events, or concepts they have not directly encountered (Gross & Fox, 
2009; Hayes et al., 2001) and explains why an individual sometimes responds to the demands 
of a ‘direct’ measure differently to how they respond to the demands of an ‘indirect’ measure 
(Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). According to RFT, arbitrarily-applicable relational 
responses are acquired through historical learning processes that inform the momentary 
responding that occurs within specific contexts; so there is no need for cognitive structures 
and suppositional mental processes (Hughes et al., 2012; Uttal, 2000). This absolute “context 
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dependency” (Schwarz, 2008; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001, p. 17) is in keeping with Skinner’s 
assertion that all behaviour begins in the environment, not in the psyche (Skinner, 1965). 
Furthermore, the inherently pragmatic nature of the RFT analysis of attitudes means that it is 
not necessary to unpack how an attitudinal response occurs (especially using hypothetical 
mental components; Uttal, 2000) but it is important to establish why an individual evaluates 
an attitude object as they do. 
 
1.5.1 Stimulus Equivalence, Derived Relational Responding, and Relational 
 Frame Theory (RFT) 
 
The phenomenon of stimulus equivalence was first observed when Murray Sidman 
and his colleagues were teaching two children with severe intellectual disability to read 
(Sidman & Cresson, 1973). The two boys were able to match printed words with spoken 
words having only been taught to match (a) spoken words with pictures, and, (b) the same 
pictures with printed words. So, the boys were able to match printed words with spoken 
words despite not having been taught how to do so (Sidman & Cresson, 1973). The ability of 
humans to correctly match stimuli in such a manner defies the principles of classical and 
operant conditioning, in that the derived stimulus relationships have not been previously 
acquired and there is no pre-existing matching behaviour (for the particular sample of 
stimuli) that has been reinforced in the past (Gross & Fox, 2009; Hayes et al., 2001; Törneke, 
2010). In experimental settings, the untaught matching of stimuli often occurs during 
procedures in which the participant emits conditional discriminations, responses that are 
reinforced dependent upon the presence of another stimulus (Sidman, 2009). Since Sidman’s 
work, there has been much research into how an organism learns such discriminations 
(Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Cullinan, & Leader, 2004) and it is through 
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experimental procedures where participants perform conditional discriminations (in 
matching-to-sample tasks, for example) that stimulus equivalence is most often observed 
(Hayes et al., 2001). 
In essence, stimulus equivalence is the learned relating of two or more stimuli through 
the mathematical principles of reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity (Hayes et al., 2001; 
Törneke; 2010). Reflexivity refers to when one stimulus is correctly matched with an 
identical stimulus in a matching-to-sample task (Hayes et al., 2001). Symmetry refers to 
when one stimulus is matched with another stimulus in a way that reverses a previously 
reinforced relationship (Stimulus B = Stimulus A when only the matching of Stimulus A to 
Stimulus B has been reinforced previously; Hayes et al., 2001). Transitivity refers to when 
one stimulus is matched with a second stimulus which is then matched with a third stimulus 
and the first stimulus becomes matched with the third stimulus through a mutual relationship 
with the second stimulus (in other words, Stimulus A = Stimulus B, and, Stimulus B = 
Stimulus C, so, Stimulus A = Stimulus C, and, when combined with symmetry, Stimulus C = 
Stimulus A; Hayes et al., 2001). 
Beyond this most basic definition of the phenomenon, stimulus equivalence has also 
been defined as the process that occurs when – through human language and cognition – 
verbal stimuli become associated in ways that have not been directly learnt and reinforced in 
the past (Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Smeets, Cullinan, & Leader, 2004; Hayes et al., 
2001). This additional definition is of particular interest because it describes the core 
psychological process of RFT (Hayes et al., 2001), arbitrarily-applicable relational 
responding, or the relating of an object (and its verbal representation) with one or more 
objects (and their verbal representations) in a way that has not already been learnt by the 
individual doing the relating. Furthermore, because humans are able to emit verbal behaviour, 
they are also able to relate stimuli in arbitrary and non-formal ways (in other words, they are 
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able to relate stimuli that do not share similar physical properties; Hayes et al., 2001); and, as 
is the case with stimulus equivalence, such a cognitive-behavioural process goes against the 
principles of strict operant conditioning (Gross & Fox, 2009) because it is possible to relate 
objects in a way that has not been reinforced in the past. 
RFT is a functional interpretation of human cognition and language which posits that 
both the private events that occur within active consciousness, and the overt behavioural 
events that occur when human language is used socially, involve the relating of stimuli in 
accordance with the behavioural principle of arbitrarily-applicable relational responding 
(Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). As Hayes et al. (2000) and Törneke, 
2010) state, there are a couple of postulated ways in which two or more objects can be related 
beyond the simple matching of identical stimuli. Firstly, mutual entailment occurs when a 
stimulus is related to another stimulus in a manner that reverses a previously acquired (and 
reinforced) relation. Secondly, when a stimulus is related to another stimulus through 
concurrent relations with a third stimulus then combinatorial entailment is said to be taking 
place (Hayes et al., 2001; Törneke, 2010). Mutual entailment and combinatorial entailment 
are similar to the processes of symmetry and transitivity in stimulus equivalence. However, 
there is an added complexity to the relations that occur when verbal stimuli are related than 
when non-verbal stimuli are matched on purely formal or associative grounds. For example, 
if a stimulus is related to another stimulus due to its greater size (i.e., one object is “larger” 
than the other object which is “smaller” than it), then in purely verbal terms neither the 
stimuli or their relationship are symmetrical (in other words, Stimulus A = Stimulus B, but 
within language and cognition, Stimulus B ≠ Stimulus A as “smaller” is not the same as 
“larger” and hence the relationship is not symmetrical). Similarly, the six concurrent 
associations that occur in transitivity work on the assumption that some sort of equivalence 
exists between the three stimuli that are matched (or equated) and so some form of 
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equivalence exists between the six stimulus associations (A = B, B = A, B = C, C = B, A = C, 
C = A); yet as was demonstrated in the first example, such an equivalence is not necessary 
within arbitrarily-applicable relational responding as it allows – through human verbal 
behaviour – for the arbitrary relating of stimuli without recourse to strict matching (Hayes et 
al., 2001). 
When two or more stimuli become related through mutual or combinatorial 
entailment they are said to be in a relational frame, which is not so much a hypothetical 
mental structure as a term of reference for a particular cognitive-behavioural event that 
occurs during arbitrarily-applicable relational responding. Relational frames can be said to 
define the specific nature of the momentary relation between two or more stimuli with there 
being a myriad of possible relation types available (although the most prevalent frames are 
those of co-ordination or opposition; Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). 
Furthermore, within such momentary behavioural events, a stimulus can assume the functions 
of another stimulus merely by being present within a relational frame with another stimulus 
(Hayes et al., 2001; Törneke, 2010). In other words, if a particular verbal stimulus becomes 
mutually or combinatorially entailed with another verbal stimulus, then the behavioural 
function of either stimulus may be transferred on to the other. This process can be witnessed 
in the ‘real world’ when an individual responds to a previously neutral object in a fearful way 
because that object has been placed in a relational frame with an object that the individual is 
afraid of (as is the case when an individual responds to an unattended suitcase in a public 
place as though it almost certainly is a bomb). The transference of behavioural function may 
also occur when novel attitudes are formed, something that can be recreated experimentally 
through the presentation of an attitude object with a verbal stimulus of either a positive or 
negative valence (such as trait adjective with positive or negative connotations). 
RFT is a theoretical account of human language and cognition (Hayes et al., 2001) 
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that is deeply relevant to the behaviour-analytic (and functional) interpretation of the attitude 
construct. Indeed, within this perspective, arbitrarily-applicable relational responding is the 
implicit and explicit evaluative behaviour that occurs in the private and public expression of 
attitudes. And finally, arbitrarily-applicable relational responding adequately accounts for the 
divergences that often occur when an attitude is accessed using ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ 
measures (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010). As will be discussed in the next section, the 
Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012) Model has been offered as a functional account of 
implicit and explicit attitudinal responding and an explanation of why the two forms of 
evaluation so often disagree. 
 
1.5.2 The Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) Model 
 
Despite being primarily a behaviour-analytic explanation as to why there are different 
types of relational responding, the Relational Elaboration and Coherence (REC) Model is 
offered here as a functional interpretation of implicit and explicit attitudes (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). Like RFT, the REC Model 
is predicated on the assumption that all language and cognition involves relating 
combinations of stimuli in a behavioural process known as relational responding (or, to give 
the process its full title, arbitrarily-applicable relational responding; Hayes et al., 2001; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). When an individual is given little time to respond to a 
stimulus, they may emit a “brief and immediate relational response” (BIRR; Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013, p. 102), which is broadly synonymous to an automatically produced 
implicit evaluation. However, when an individual is given more time to respond to a stimuli, 
they may emit an initial BIRR which is then followed by a series of further relational 
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responses which may or may not feature elements of the original response (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013) along with relational responses to other salient 
stimuli in the proximal environment (a little like the controlled, deliberate, and context-
dependent responding that occurs during explicit evaluations; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2011; Payne & Gawronski, 2010). 
To offer an example of this process, imagine a woman has returned to her hometown 
after an absence of several years in which she travelled the world and fell in love with her 
current partner who is also the father of her child. While driving down the main street, the 
woman sees an ex-partner whose infidelity resulted in her leaving the town several years 
earlier. When the woman first sees her ex-partner she may emit a BIRR in which he is 
evaluated negatively in verbal terms in accordance with the woman’s learning history. (In 
other words, the ex-partner is in a learned or derived frame of co-ordination with any number 
of negative trait adjectives such as “untrustworthy”, “unfaithful”, or “two-timing”.) However, 
as she continues to drive down the road, the woman’s initial evaluation may be followed by 
further relational responses in which the ex-partner and his actions are given equivalency to 
such verbal responses as “causing freedom” and a range of positive memories associated with 
the woman’s time overseas, her subsequent intimate relationship, and the birth of her child. 
This pattern of additional cognition is called an “extended and elaborated relational response” 
(or “EERR”; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013, p. 102) and if given enough time, EER-
Responding should cohere into a network of relational responses that reflects both the 
woman’s unique learning history and the momentary context she is in (Hughes et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, as the woman’s most immediate relational response is added to by further 
relational responses, it is possible that some of the additional responses are oppositional, 
indicating that it is indeed possible to hold contradictory attitudes towards an attitude object 
within certain contexts. 
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As should be apparent from the above example, the two types of relational responding 
are not so much separate operations as different manifestations of the same behavioural 
process. The main distinction between the two forms is that for BIRRs to be automatic and 
unconsidered and EERRs to be deliberate and controlled, the former must occupy less time 
than the latter (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). Simply put, because 
BIRRs are time-pressured in a way that EERRs are not, it should take longer to emit an 
extended and possibly complex pattern of relational responses than the short time it takes to 
emit a few automatic relational evaluations. However, even though BIRRs can be performed 
in less time than EERRs, it does not mean that the brief responses are always emitted (and 
completed) at an earlier point in time to more elaborate responses. Due to the nature of 
arbitrarily-applicable relational responding, EERRs can contain multiple BIRRs and be the 
antecedent stimuli to brief-and-immediate responses in and of themselves (Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2013). Accordingly, there is no limit to the complexity of implicit and explicit 
evaluations when such cognitive events are considered from a purely functional behaviour-
analytic perspective without recourse to any mediating mental constructs (Hughes et al., 
2011; Hughes et al., 2012). 
The complex responding that is implied by the REC Model may account for 
incidences in which ‘indirect’ measures of implicit attitudes disagree with ‘direct’ measures 
of explicit attitudes (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2012). For example, an 
individual may evaluate a person of the opposite sex negatively (due to their unique learning 
history) when presented with a procedure that sets the conditions for automatic and 
unconscious responding; but when presented with a request for the same attitude within a 
social setting, given time to respond, the individual may offer an answer that suggests they 
value people of the opposite sex in a more positive way. The REC Model explains such 
contradictory responding as follows: relational responding is either acquired through 
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mediation by the verbal community or performed as some form of derived (and unlearned 
response; Hughes et al., 2012). Accordingly, a stimulus is more likely to be equivalent to 
another stimulus when at least one other person reinforces the stated relational frame (Hayes 
et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013); however, such reinforcement is not a 
compulsory requirement of arbitrarily-applicable relational responding (Hayes et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, the social mediation of relational responses occurs on a broader and more 
elaborate scale when an individual’s relational responding is mediated by the verbal 
community at large (as is the case when someone conforms to the ‘norms’ of their society). 
So, an individual’s initial BIRR may involve relating two stimuli in a way that may or may 
not have been reinforced in the past by a single individual or a small subset of society, but, 
given both the time to respond elaborately and the presentation of the same two stimuli in a 
context containing many other latent relational networks, their EERR may result in a very 
different type of evaluation (and one that more readily coheres with the ‘normative’ response 
expected by the verbal community). So to return to the earlier example, the sexist individual 
may readily profess their negative opinion of the opposite sex when alone or with one other 
person, but they may become far more equalitarian when presented with a more complex 
social context and the time to respond elaborately (such as having to evaluate a person of the 
opposite sex in a television studio with a live audience, the majority of whom would not 
tolerate such sexist opinions). 
On a purely pragmatic level, the REC Model is important because it allows for the 
two most-postulated types of evaluative cognitive event to be described, differentiated, and 
explained in functional terms without the need for either hypothesised mental structures or 
suppositional psychological processes (Hughes et al., 2012). However, as Hughes and 
Barnes-Holmes (2013) assert, the use of observable (and recordable) behaviour as a proxy for 
a hypothetical mental event is still prevalent within attitude research despite there being 
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adequate precision and scope in the explanations offered by those seeking to analyse the 
functional nature of attitudes and evaluative cognition. One possible reason for this reliance 
on ‘mentalistic’ constructs is the evident need of many researchers to explain in mechanistic 
terms what happens when an attitude is formed, retained, and activated. Yet functional 
interpretations of evaluative behaviour may readily be used to account for why people 
perform initial evaluations, why such evaluative behaviour persists over time, and why such 
behaviour responds so readily to changes in context (Hughes et al., 2011). Furthermore, the 
measures used by individuals working in accordance with the functional interpretation of 
attitudes access ‘online’ evaluations as the very behavioural events they are purported to be 
and not as proxies of unobservable cognition (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 
2012). Accordingly, the following sections focus on a small sample of behaviour-analytic 
measures of implicit attitudes including the Relational Evaluation Procedure, which was a 
direct precursor to the IRAP. 
 
1.6 Behaviour-Analytic Measures 
 
For a research methodology to be valid, its conception, development, and deployment 
must be informed by the theoretical and philosophical assumptions that underpin the target 
construct and its associated field of inquiry. In other words, the scientific approach used to 
measure a psychological construct of interest (be it implicit attitudes, evaluative cognition, or 
arbitrarily-applicable relational responding) should occupy the same suppositional ‘space’ as 
the construct and operate within the same epistemological and ontological ‘rules’. A 
fundamental reason for this philosophical and theoretical consistency is the scientific need for 
a research methodology to accurately access and record whatever it is designed and deployed 
to measure (Coolican, 2009; Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 2013). For example, in order to 
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successfully record episodes of the behaviour specifically associated with a particular 
psychological construct (in lieu of being able to directly access the construct itself), a 
methodology must account for how the construct is defined and how it influences overt and 
observable responding (if at all). However, in the design and application of psychological 
research methods, such an analysis can be taken too far into the theoretical and philosophical 
realms. Indeed, one significant problem with a good deal of ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ measures 
of explicit and implicit attitudes is that they rely upon such a weight of supposition that they 
may, in fact, not be recording what they are intended to record (for example, it is possible that 
the IAT measures implicit associations rather than implicit attitudes; Hughes et al., 2011). 
This concern is arguably less common in the deployment of behaviour-analytic 
methodologies as the measures directly access what they are supposed to access: behaviour as 
it is performed ‘online’. Accordingly, the following two sections outline a brief sample of 
behaviour-analytic procedures. As will become evident, the methods were not primarily 
designed to access implicit or explicit attitudes per se; however, the procedures all promote 
relational responding which is what evaluative cognition is in behaviour-analytic terms. 
 
1.6.1 The Stimulus Equivalence Procedure 
 
Unlike the two behaviour-analytic approaches that are discussed after this one, the 
stimulus-equivalence procedure is not a discrete, made-to-order assessment tool; rather it is a 
broad class of techniques that all involve matching-to-sample procedures and the use of 
conditional discrimination (the reinforcement of a correct response following the presentation 
of a sample stimulus alongside a series of comparison stimuli; Sidman, 2009). Accordingly, 
the stimulus-equivalence procedure used by Watt, Keenan, Barnes, and Cairns (1991) is 
offered here as a useful explanatory example of a prevalent form of behaviour-analytic 
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psychological testing. The procedure is also being discussed because it is a key precursor to 
the IRAP through its use of a computer-based programme to both train and test the 
participants in an experimental setting. 
Watt et al.’s (1991) experiment featured a group of Northern-Irish Protestants, a group 
of Northern-Irish Catholics, and a group of English Protestants. The participants in all three 
groups were exposed to a double-barrelled training procedure in which the participants were 
continuously and then intermittently reinforced for correctly matching three Catholic names 
with three nonsense syllables and for correctly matching the same three nonsense syllables 
with three Protestant symbols (Watt et al., 1991). The training phase used a computer-based 
programme in which either a Catholic name or a nonsense syllable (the sample stimuli; Watt 
et al., 1991) was presented on-screen above a combination of nonsense syllables and 
Protestant symbols (the comparison stimuli; Watt et al., 1991). The participant was then 
asked to select one of the comparison stimuli by pressing the keyboard key that had been 
allocated to it. Feedback was then provided by the presentation of either the word “Correct” 
or the word “Wrong” and the sounding of either a high-pitched tone or a low-pitched tone 
depending on whether or not the preceding response was the right one. In the testing phase, 
the participants undertook the same matching-to-sample task; however, no feedback was 
presented. 
One interesting outcome of the study was that, rather than matching Catholic names to 
Protestant symbols as per the contingency at play, some of the participants matched 
Protestant names to Protestant symbols with this type of incorrect response being performed 
by participants in all three experimental groups (Watt et al., 1991). This discrepancy offers 
some support for the Relational Elaboration and Coherence Model (REC; Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012) in that 
some of the participants may have been responding to the stimuli as per their matching-to-
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sample training but also in a way that cohered with the networks of stimulus relations that 
existed within the wider social context. In other words, in accordance with their individual 
learning histories, some of the participants related the Protestant names to Protestant symbols 
despite being trained not to. Accordingly, one of the limitations of Watt et al.’s (1991) study 
is that it is evidently not possible to accurately assess experimental learning when familiar 
stimuli are used. Furthermore, there is a possible ethical concern to reinforcing the matching 
of familiar stimuli in a non-normative way, especially when the stimuli have some level of 
association with social unrest or trauma (as is the case in Watt et al.’s experiment; 1991). 
The aforementioned concerns with Watt et al.’s (1991) study aside, one of the general 
limitations of the stimulus-equivalence approach is that it only assesses whether or not an 
individual is able to cognitively associate two or more stimuli in the simplest sense and not 
whether or not they are able to cognitively relate the stimuli within either individual relational 
frames or more elaborate relational networks (which is purported to be more likely to happen 
within everyday language and cognition; Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et al., 2012). This drawback was addressed in the 
conceptualisation and design of two measures of arbitrarily-applicable relational responding: 
the Relational Evaluation Procedure and the IRAP. 
 
1.6.2 The Relational Evaluation Procedure as a Direct Precursor to the Implicit 
 Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) 
 
With the introduction of RFT (Hayes et al., 2001) came the premise that, through the 
behavioural process of arbitrarily-applicable relational responding, verbal and non-verbal 
stimuli are related within language and cognition to powerful effect; furthermore, such 
stimuli can be relationally responded to in a way that is either directly learned or entirely 
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derived from other learned relations (Törneke, 2010). As was mentioned earlier, the ability to 
relate stimuli in ways that have not been previously reinforced is similar to the behavioural 
phenomenon of stimulus equivalence (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2004). However, there is one 
important and irreconcilable difference between the principles at play within stimulus 
equivalence and those at play within RFT: unlike the strict reciprocity of reflexivity, 
symmetry, and transitivity, arbitrarily-applicable relational responding accounts for the bi-
directional cognitive framing that occurs when two qualitatively different stimuli become 
related in a mutually entailed way (Hayes et al., 2001). For example, Stimulus B may be an 
object that is “taller” than Stimulus A (an object that is “shorter” than Stimulus B), so when a 
person learns to relate Stimulus B to Stimulus A (and Stimulus A to Stimulus B) it is not 
through some form of equivalence matching (they are after all both physically and verbally 
different) but through a process by which the bi-directional relating of stimuli becomes a 
learned behaviour (Hayes et al., 2001). This fundamental premise is extended in the process 
of combinatorial entailment (Hayes et al., 2001), whereby a third object (Stimulus C) 
becomes related to the first stimulus (A) in a way that is similar to how the second stimulus 
(B) relates to it regardless of the similarity or dissimilarity of the second and third stimuli 
(such as when Stimulus C is “taller” than Stimulus A but not quite as tall as Stimulus B). 
The implications for psychometric testing (which includes the assessment of implicit 
and explicit attitudes) are that it is not possible to test for arbitrarily-applicable relational 
responding using only a matching-to-sample scenario (as occurs within the stimulus-
equivalence procedure; Watt et al., 1991) or some form of associative paradigm (Hughes et 
al., 2011). Rather, it is more appropriate (and arguably more true-to-life; Hayes et al., 2001) 
to present combinations of stimuli to a participant who attends to the stimuli before selecting 
the appropriate relational term from an array of two (or possibly more) response options 
(such as the oppositional words “Same” and “Different”; Barnes-Holmes, Hayden, Barnes-
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Holmes, & Stewart, 2008). This approach was first attempted by behaviour analysts with the 
Precursor to the Relational Evaluation Procedure (Cullinan, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets, 
2001); however, this seminal measure still used matching-to-sample testing and it was not 
until the Relational Evaluation Procedure (REP) that a methodology truly accessed 
arbitrarily-applicable relational responding in accordance with the principles of RFT (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2008; Vahey, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009). 
The REP is a behaviour-analytic approach that is a direct precursor to the featured 
‘indirect’ methodology of my research project; and like the IRAP, the REP is predicated on 
the assumption that both language and cognition are comprised of relational frames (Hayes et 
al., 2001). Within each trial of the REP, an individual is asked to report on the type of 
relationship that exists between two stimuli presented to them simultaneously (Barnes-
Holmes et al., 2008; Vahey et al., 2009). For instance, two shapes may be shown 
concurrently with a pair of relational terms such as “Similar” and “Opposite” or “Same” and 
“Different”. The test-user then selects the term that best describes the relation between the 
shapes (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2004; Vahey et al., 
2009), a response that momentarily clears the screen in preparation for the presentation of the 
next stimuli and relational response options. 
Unlike some of the ‘indirect’ measures of implicit attitudes being used at the time, the 
REP did not limit the time a test-user was given to respond. Accordingly, the REP is a pure 
measure of arbitrarily-applicable relational responding as defined by RFT (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2008). But, because an individual taking the REP can respond in a controlled and 
deliberate way within each trial, the procedure is unable to elicit the type of BIRRs that are 
described and explained by the REC Model (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes et al., 2012; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2011). Therefore, the procedure may also be 
unable to access any implicit attitudes that the participants may hold. Given that the REP was 
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not intended to produce automatic and uncontrolled responding (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013; Stewart et al., 2004), a further behaviour-analytic assessment tool was developed in 
which there is a need for participants to respond quickly and accurately to paired stimuli in 
relational terms (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008). The resultant methodology is called the 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) and its deployment has allowed behaviour 
analysts to study implicit attitudes in functional (and hence relational) terms (Barnes-Holmes 
et al., 2008; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes et al., 
2011; Hughes et al., 2012). 
The IRAP is a computer-based measure of implicit (or brief-and-immediate) relational 
responding that requires participants to relate sample and target stimuli within a series of 
discrete trials. As Barnes-Holmes et al. (2008) and Vahey et al. (2009) assert, the IRAP 
combines the relational-response requirements of the REP with the alternating conditions and 
response-time requirements of the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998). A participant using the 
IRAP is required to sometimes respond in a way that is consistent with their learning history 
and to sometimes respond in a way that is inconsistent with it (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008). 
This is achieved by presenting blocks of trials in which the participants must agree with a 
verbal rule and blocks of trials in which they must agree with a second verbal rule that is 
oppositional to the first rule (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008). Within each discrete trial, the 
participant is also required to either affirm or negate whether the presented stimuli conform to 
whichever rule is then in place (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, throughout 
each testing block, there is a requirement for the participants to respond quickly and 
accurately with feedback provided for slow or incorrect responses.  
Since its development in 2004 (Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 2015), the IRAP has been 
used to evoke BIRRs to a broad range of verbal and pictorial stimuli in both experimental and 
applied settings. Among the attitude objects that have been targeted, the IRAP has been used 
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to access implicit attitudes to work and leisure (Chan et al., 2009), racial stereotyping 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010), religion (Drake et al., 2010), children and adults as sexual 
beings (Dawson, Barnes-Holmes, Gresswell, Hart, & Gore, 2009), meat and vegetables 
(Barnes-Holmes, Murtagh, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2010), gender (Drake et al., 2010), 
race (Drake et al., 2010; Power, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2009), spiders 
(Nicholson & Barnes-Holmes, 2012), the elderly (Cullen, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Stewart, 2009), young people (Cullen et al., 2009), obesity (Drake et al., 2010), self-esteem 
(Vahey et al., 2009), smoking (Vahey, Boles, & Barnes-Holmes, 2010), depression (Hussey 
& Barnes-Holmes, 2012), forgiveness (Bast & Barnes-Holmes, 2014), and verbal stimuli the 
participants would not have encountered prior to taking the assessment procedure (Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Because the rest of this Master’s thesis will feature a series of 
scientific reports on the experimental application of the IRAP, the minutiae of procedure’s 
construction and application will not be discussed here. Suffice it say however, that there is a 
growing body of research that supports the use of the IRAP as a valid measure of implicit 
evaluative cognition. 
 
1.7 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter was intended to provide a broad overview of scientific research into 
human evaluative behaviour. It began with a discussion on some of the more popular 
definitions and interpretations of the attitude construct before explicit and implicit attitudes 
were described alongside discussions on the measures used to access and record such 
evaluations and the particular complexities inherent in doing so. Following the presentation 
of a range of cognitivist models and theories, I proposed that attitudes can be considered as 
types of behaviour in and of themselves. To support this premise, the ensuing sub-sections 
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presented the related behavioural phenomena of stimulus equivalence and arbitrarily-
applicable relational responding along with an overview of RFT (Hayes et al., 2001) and the 
REC Model (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 
2012). In the previous two sections, there were discussions on two of the behaviour-analytic 
measures that influenced the featured methodology of this research project before a brief 
mention was made of the IRAP itself. 
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Chapter 2 
Experiment 1: A Replication of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) Study 
of Induced Implicit Attitudes 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) is a computer-based measure 
of differential relational responding which records how long participants take to relate textual 
or pictorial stimuli presented on a screen or monitor. As Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2013, 
p. 102) report, the IRAP evokes and records “brief and immediate relational responses” 
(BIRRs) on the assumption that each test user has a history of relational responding and that 
this history can be accessed by getting the test user to react both in accordance and in 
disagreement with it. The procedure contains trial blocks in which the test-user is asked to 
respond in a way that is consistent with what they have learned in the past and trial blocks in 
which they are asked to respond in way that is inconsistent with their previously acquired 
relational networks (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et 
al., 2012). There is also the opportunity within each individual trial for the participant to 
either affirm or negate what is being presented to them in accordance with the particular rule 
at play (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, to make sure that only BIRRS are 
accessed, the IRAP prompts the participants to react quickly and accurately and provides 
feedback when they either take too long or produce an incorrect response. 
The requirement for each test-user to hastily produce the desired response within 
these alternating circumstances creates the conditions that result in the automatic cognition 
that is associated with brief-and-immediate relational responding (Barnes-Holmes et al., 
2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). In addition to generating implicit cognitive-
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behaviour as a procedural outcome, the IRAP’s response-demands produce multiple patterns 
of responding that differ in subtle ways. For example, it is suggested that test users react 
faster on trials in which they have to respond in a way that is consistent with what they have 
learnt than on trials in which they have to respond in way that is inconsistent with their 
learning history (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008). Furthermore, it is also possible that test users 
react faster on trials in which they are asked to affirm a rule than on those trials in which they 
are required to negate it (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Accordingly, the principal 
outcome measure of the IRAP is the difference in mean response times between either 
consistent and inconsistent trial blocks (Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 2013) or the different 
trial types, with any bias in responding being considered an ‘IRAP effect’ (Barnes-Holmes et 
al., 2008; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hussey, Thompson, McEnteggart, Barnes-
Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2014). Furthermore, it is suggested that the presence of an 
implicit attitude (or at least implicit cognitive-behaviour) can then be inferred from the 
presence of such an effect (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 
2013; Hughes et al., 2012). 
The IRAP is a methodology that is based on both the core assumptions of Relational 
Frame Theory (RFT; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006; Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2011; 
Vahey et al., 2009) and the functional interpretation of the attitude construct (Golijani-
Moghaddam et al., 2013; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2011; Hughes et 
al., 2012). Accordingly, the cognitive-behavioural responses evoked by the procedure are 
considered ‘acts-in-context’ (Biglan & Hayes, 1996) that can be described and explained in 
purely behaviour-analytic terms. These ‘acts’ are arbitrarily-applicable relational responses in 
which the test user reacts to the stimuli that are presented to them by selecting the response 
option that best describes the relation between the stimuli (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). The 
IRAP promotes (and evokes) arbitrarily-applicable relational responding due to the 
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participant needing to place the stimuli within relational frames in order to progress through 
the assessment procedure. These relational frames may take any form (for example, they may 
be frames of co-ordination, opposition, or difference; Hayes et al., 2001); however, the 
relational nature of the frames is ultimately decided upon by the experimenter and prompted 
by the procedure itself (Hughes et al., 2011). Furthermore, because the IRAP measures 
implicit cognitive events in functional and not mentalistic terms, it is not used to measure the 
strength of hypothetical mental associations and so the spatial and temporal features prevalent 
in the associative measures of implicit cognition (such as the various procedures that use 
evaluative and semantic priming; Hughes et al., 2011; Krosnick et al., 2005; Wittenbrink, 
2007; Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007) are absent in the procedure. Rather, the IRAP presents 
the sample stimuli, target stimuli, and response options simultaneously in order to evoke a 
prompted relational response using verbal behaviour. The presence (or absence) of an 
implicit attitude is then inferred from the difference in mean response times between the 
consistent and inconsistent trial blocks (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2008). 
The first use of the IRAP involved recording BIRRs towards a range of everyday 
verbal stimuli. Participants were presented with the words “Pleasant” and “Unpleasant” as 
sample stimuli, the words “Similar” and “Opposite” as response options, and – as target 
stimuli – six words that are normatively considered to be pleasant in meaning and six words 
considered to be unpleasant (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Following two practice blocks of 
24 trials, there were alternating consistent and inconsistent trial blocks (of 24 trials apiece) 
and an even distribution of trials in which the proposed stimulus relation needed to be either 
affirmed or negated in accordance with whichever one of two verbal rules was at play (with 
the two rules being: (1) that pleasant target stimuli are “Similar” to the sample stimulus 
“Pleasant” and unpleasant target stimuli are “Similar” to the sample stimulus “Unpleasant” 
on consistent trials, and, (2) that pleasant target stimuli are “Similar” to the sample stimulus 
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“Unpleasant” and unpleasant target stimuli are “Similar” to the sample stimulus “Pleasant” 
on inconsistent trials with the combinations of stimuli featuring the response option 
“Opposite” being the reverse of these stated relations for both rules). Multiple ‘effects’ were 
observed in the first IRAP study, as the participants took less time to respond in accordance 
with their learning histories than it took for them to respond in disagreement with them 
(Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). In other words, when asked to assert that pleasant words were 
indeed “Pleasant” and unpleasant words were indeed “Unpleasant”, the participants did so 
more quickly than when they were asked to assert that the opposite was true (Barnes-Holmes 
et al., 2006). Therefore, from the results of Barnes-Holmes et al.’s (2006) research, it is 
possible to infer that: (1) the pleasant and unpleasant target stimuli were more readily in 
frames of co-ordination with consistent sample stimuli than with inconsistent (and 
oppositional) stimuli, and that, (2) as a group, the participants held implicit attitudes towards 
the verbal stimuli that could be considered normative. 
Not long after the first significant ‘IRAP effects’ were recorded in an experimental 
setting, research was undertaken to see whether differential relational responding still occurs 
when the participants are made aware of the demand characteristics of the methodology 
(McKenna, Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart; 2007). Participants were given either 
explanations of why ‘IRAP effects’ happen or detailed strategies on how to fake the IRAP. 
Neither manipulation influenced their subsequent behaviour, however, and despite being told 
what was expected of them and how to respond differently, the participants still reacted faster 
on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials (McKenna et al., 2007). This shows that even 
being told the rule at play within each trial block fails to influence the participants’ brief-and-
immediate relational responding. Indeed, the results of McKenna et al.’s (2007) study suggest 
that the IRAP is a measure of implicit attitudes free from desirability bias or any form of 
impression management (Hughes et al., 2011), an assertion that has been built on by other 
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studies that have provided empirical support for the IRAP as a reliable and valid ‘indirect’ 
measure (Golijani-Moghaddam et al., 2013). 
As well as recording well-established patterns of responding to combinations of 
familiar (and meaningful) stimuli, the IRAP can be used to train and test new relational 
responses and hence new implicit attitudes. One way this can be done is by altering a test-
user’s existing relational network by exposing them to novel relational frames (Hughes et al., 
2012). For example, an individual who demonstrates biased responding against a particular 
attitude object may have that bias reduced through exposure to the disfavoured object in a 
frame of co-ordination with a favoured stimulus. This type of manipulation occurs in Cullen 
et al.’s (2009) study in which participants who were shown pictures of well-known and well-
respected elderly people then demonstrated less ageist attitudes towards the sample stimulus 
“Old People” (p. 597). However, the alteration of an individual’s prior history of learning is 
not an easily controlled process as it is difficult to account for every single relational frame 
within their network of stimulus relations (Hughes et al., 2012). Accordingly, the formation 
of implicit attitudes (and new relational responses) is best demonstrated when participants are 
exposed to things that they have had no opportunity to encounter in the past, something that 
requires researchers to create novel pictorial or textual stimuli with no obvious similarity to 
any pre-existing attitude objects. 
There has been little work undertaken to access newly engineered implicit attitudes in 
an experimental setting; yet this is exactly what Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2011) did in 
their study of the “formation and persistence of implicit attitudes” (p. 391). Their experiment 
involved the use of the IRAP and written materials to engineer the sort of differential 
relational responding from which the presence of implicit attitudes can be inferred (Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2011). In order to acquire these inferred implicit attitudes, participants were 
exposed to two novel stimuli (the words “Cug” and “Vek”) in one of three attitude-induction 
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conditions. In the first condition, a training IRAP provided feedback that shaped the 
participants’ brief-and-immediate relational responding over multiple discrete trials. In the 
second condition, a written narrative presented the two potential attitude objects (the words 
“Cug” and “Vek”) as equivalent to a series of either positive or negative trait adjectives. In 
the third condition, participants were presented with both the training IRAP and the written 
narrative. All three of these experimental manipulations generated implicit attitudes of 
varying strengths; yet with continued exposure to the testing IRAP, the newly engineered 
attitudes weakened over time (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Accordingly, the aim of my 
first experiment was to see whether such a weakening occurred again during a strict 
replication of the original study. 
 
2.2 Method 
 
In order to replicate Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) experiment as strictly as 
possible, I contacted the original study’s authors to seek advice on administering the IRAP 
and to confirm any experimental details not overtly discussed in their published paper. As in 
the original study, the sample stimuli presented to the participants in Experiment 1 were the 
nonsense words “Cug” and “Vek” and the response options were the words “Opposite” and 
“Similar”. Furthermore, the IRAP was administered in Experiment 1 using similar response-
option parameters to those used in the earlier experiment and exactly the same mastery, 
response-latency, and accuracy criteria as those reported by Hughes and Barnes-Holmes. 
However, because Barnes-Holmes could not locate the experimental materials (personal 
communication, May 11, 2015), my participants were exposed to a different written narrative, 
a different set of target stimuli, and a different set of written instructions to the corresponding 
items that were presented to the participants in the original study. 
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2.2.1 Participants 
 
The participants (n = 12) were all undergraduate students enrolled in the School of 
Psychology on the University of Waikato’s Hamilton campus. They were recruited via a 
posting on the School of Psychology’s online news forum and through direct contact via 
email (for those students who had previously expressed an interest in being involved in post-
graduate psychological research). Because the D-IRAP transformation (which is the first part 
of the statistical process for determining the presence of an ‘IRAP effect’; Drake et al., 2010; 
Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hussey, Barnes-Holmes, & Barnes-Holmes, 2015) accounts 
for individual differences in age, cognitive ability, and motor skills (Hughes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2011) no demographic details were taken. However, English was not a first language 
for two of the participants. All of the participants undertook Experiment 1 in the same room 
in the School of Psychology. The participants were asked on the consent form whether they 
wished to be contacted about the results of the research and those that did were presented 
with a summary of the experimental findings via email. Ethical approval was granted by the 
School of Psychology Research and Ethics Committee (#15:64). 
 
2.2.2 Materials and Equipment 
 
2.2.2.1 ‘Indirect’ Training and Testing Procedures 
 
The IRAP was used to both engineer implicit attitudes in the contingency-learning 
and combined-learning conditions and to access and record brief-and-immediate relational 
responding by all participants in all three conditions. In each trial of the IRAP the participant 
was presented with a sample stimulus (which was either the word “Cug” or the word “Vek”), 
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a target stimulus (which was any one of 12 positive or negative trait adjectives or their 
equivalent nouns), and a series of response options (the words “Similar” and “Opposite”; see 
Figure 2.1 for a 4-picture representation of the above description; the various verbal stimuli 
are presented in Figure 2.2). For each trial, the participant was required to attend to the 
sample and target stimuli and then select one of the two response options by pressing either 
the “d” key on a keyboard with the index or middle finger of the left hand or the “k” key with 
the index or middle finger of the right hand. If the participant’s response was incorrect they 
were shown a red “X”, which was presented in the middle of the screen to prompt the 
participant to make a different response. If the correct response was given, the screen was 
cleared for 400 ms before the next combination of stimuli was presented. In order for the 
programme to test implicit relational responding that was brief and immediate (Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2013), there was a time restriction for each response (with a maximum 
median latency of 3,000 ms across each trial block as per the original experiment; Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Accordingly, if a participant responded too slowly after the first pair 
of practice blocks in the testing procedure or after the first pair of trial blocks in the training 
procedure, they were met with a custom message which read “Too slow!” The need to 
respond quickly was also stated in all the participants’ written instructions. 
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Figure 2.1. Example screen presentations of the four different trial types that occur within the 
IRAP’s testing programme. The two sample stimuli are the words “Vek” and “Cug”; the words 
“Virtue” and “Nastiness” are two of the twelve positively or negatively valenced target words 
that were used in the testing programme; and the words “Similar” and “Opposite” represent the 
two available response options (with the nearby prompting phrases used to instruct the 
participant which key to press). 
 
To determine whether a participant had acquired the desired BIRRs, a required 
accuracy level of 95% for the training blocks and 80% for the testing blocks was 
implemented for each application of the IRAP. Furthermore, participants in all three 
conditions were given between one and four pairs of practice blocks to help them master 
relational responding in accordance with whichever verbal rule was in place. These practice 
blocks were presented as part of the testing IRAP (regardless of condition) and were 
particularly important for the participants who underwent verbal instruction as they had 
received no other exposure to the IRAP programme and no previous exposure to inconsistent 
trial blocks (in which they were expected to respond in a way that contradicted what they 
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knew; Barnes-Holmes et al., 2006). Within all three experimental conditions, an incorrect 
response in the testing IRAP resulted in the presentation of a red “X” and the opportunity to 
respond differently; however, in the two applications of the training programme, the correct 
relational term was also shown alongside the red “X” so that the participant would be 
prompted to respond differently and be reminded of the verbal rule at play. Failure to meet 
the accuracy and response-time criteria in any one of the practice and training blocks 
produced an inter-block screen which displayed the participant’s accuracy score and median-
response time for the previous trial block as well as a reminder of what the various response 
criteria were. Failure to meet the response criteria within any given practice or training block 
also meant that the participant had to take a further pair of consistent and inconsistent trial 
blocks (in the practice phase of the testing programme) or a single consistent block (in the 
training programme) until a total of eight blocks had been taken; and if the participant failed 
to meet the response criteria by the last training block or the last pair of practice blocks they 
were thanked for their involvement and their data were removed from the later analysis. Of 
the 12 participants in Experiment 1, only one failed to meet the various response demands of 
the practice phase of the testing programme. 
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Table 2.1 
The Verbal Stimuli Presented On-screen during the Training and Testing IRAPs 
 Sample Stimuli Target Stimuli  Response Options 
Relational 
Training 
Procedure 
(IRAP) 
Cug, Vek Positively valenced trait 
adjectives: virtuous, wise, good, 
peaceful, caring, generous 
 
Negatively valenced trait 
adjectives: nasty, ignorant, evil, 
violent, cruel, selfish 
Similar, Opposite 
Relational 
Testing 
Procedure 
(IRAP) 
Cug, Vek Positively valenced nouns: virtue, 
wisdom, goodness, peace, 
kindness, generosity 
 
Negatively valenced nouns: 
nastiness, ignorance, evil, violence, 
cruelty, selfishness 
Similar, Opposite 
 
In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the same two words were used as sample 
stimuli. The target words were altered between training and testing procedures (the use of 
adjectives in the training IRAP ensured the target stimuli in the computer-based assessment 
were the same as the comparison stimuli in the written narrative of the verbal-instruction 
condition). The same two relational response options appeared in all applications of the 
IRAP, although these relational terms swapped positions at random throughout each 
procedure to avoid any form of fixed responding. In order for the participants to acquire the 
rule that certain target words were related to a sample word in a particular way and that other 
target words were related to another sample word in a particular way, the IRAP programme 
presented multiple combinations of the three types of stimuli before providing – contingent 
on the participant’s response – either progress to the next trial or negative feedback. As 
Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2011) assert, it takes 48 trials for each of the 12 target stimuli to 
be presented with each of the two sample stimulus and response options at least once 
(accordingly, 48 trials equal a single trial block). There are four different ways to combine 
the different types of stimuli. These four ways can be stated using capital letters to denote the 
sample stimuli, equals signs and not-equals signs to denote the two relational response terms, 
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and lowercase letters to denote the various target stimuli: trial-type 1: A = {abcdef} / trial-
type 2: A ≠ {ghijkl} / trial-type 3: B = {ghijkl} / trial-type 4: B ≠ {abcdef}. As in Hughes and 
Barnes-Holmes’s study, the sample stimuli were “Cug” and “Vek”, the response options were 
the words “Similar” and “Opposite”, and the target stimuli were either positive or negative 
trait adjectives or their equivalent nouns (depending on the type of IRAP procedure being 
run). So, using only two of the 12 target stimuli (the oppositional terms “Virtue” and 
“Nastiness”) by way of an example, the four trial types are shown in Figure 2.1. Each of the 
trials places one of the sample stimuli (e.g. “Vek”) within a frame of co-ordination or 
opposition with a target stimulus (e.g. “Virtue”) in accordance with the rule at play. 
In order to induce biased relational responding in the contingency and combined-
learning conditions, I used an IRAP training procedure. The training IRAP contained only 
consistent trial blocks on the assumption that exposure to inconsistent trial blocks during the 
training phase inhibits differential responding (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). To further 
ensure that the desired BIRRs are engineered, the training IRAP can be adjusted so that near-
perfect relational responding is required across multiple trials (as was the case in Hughes & 
Barnes-Holmes’s, 2011, study). The training programme also provides within-trial and 
between-block prompts for accurate and fast responding and negative feedback for incorrect 
relating and the failure to attain the various criteria for an entire trial block. I set the training 
programme’s maximum median latency at 3,000 ms for each trial block and the response-
option parameter at a maximum hold of three trials. The last variable refers to how frequently 
the relational response terms switch sides across each trial block, which is an important 
specification that has been shown to influence the size of any ‘IRAP effect’ with static 
placements of the relational terms producing weaker differential responding (Campbell, 
Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2011). 
Finally, I used IRAP software which was conceived, designed, built, extended, and 
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updated by Dermot Barnes-Holmes between 2004 and 2012 (Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 
2015). The particular programme was a 2012 version available for download from an IRAP 
research-website that no longer exists (retrieved from http://IRAPresearch.org in January, 
2015). 
 
2.2.2.2 ‘Direct’ Verbal-Instruction Procedure 
 
The participants in the verbal-instruction and combined-learning conditions were 
exposed to a written narrative which offered a fictional account of the use of the words “Cug” 
and “Vek” by the speakers of an ancient language which is no longer used. An individual 
with a set of six particular attributes was described as a “Cug” by speakers of the ancient 
language whereas an individual with an oppositional set of six attributes was called a “Vek”. 
Using a counterbalanced structure, graphic imagery (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011), and 
repetition, the narrative presented the reader with contrasting descriptions of the two different 
types of people; furthermore, the words “Cug” and “Vek” were presented frequently 
throughout the narrative, meaning that the reader was given multiple opportunities to learn to 
relate the two novel words with a certain series of familiar attributes. To provide 
counterbalancing across conditions, half of the participants in the verbal-instruction and 
combined-learning conditions were provided with a written narrative in which the word 
“Cug” was used to describe an individual with positive attributes and the word “Vek” was 
used to describe an individual with negative attributes; the other half were provided with a 
narrative in which the attributes were reversed. 
The written narrative is as follows (with the word “Cug” used to describe a person 
with positive attributes by way of example only): 
There is an ancient language which has long since fallen from use in the 
region where it was once spoken. In this ancient language there are two 
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words used to describe two very different sorts of people. The word “Cug” 
was used to describe a person who was virtuous, wise, and good; a “Cug” 
was a peaceful person who would never beat his slaves or his family 
members; a “Cug” was caring and generous, even to his enemies. Indeed, 
a “Cug” was a good person to have around, not least because they were 
caring, generous, good, wise, virtuous, and peaceful! However, in those 
distant times not everyone was a “Cug”: the ancient language also has a 
word which was used to reference a very different sort of person. The word 
“Vek” was used to describe an individual who was nasty and ignorant; 
unlike a “Cug” a “Vek” would be violent towards his slaves and family; a 
“Vek” would behave in ways considered evil, even in the savage times in 
which the ancient language was spoken; a “Vek” was known for being 
cruel and selfish (even to a “Cug”), and if anyone was ever in need, a 
“Vek” would not do a single thing to help them. Indeed, a “Vek” was a 
bad person to have around, not least because they were cruel, violent, evil, 
ignorant, nasty, and selfish! 
 
Having read the written narrative, the participants were asked to complete two 
memory checks (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011) to confirm that they had learned to relate 
the words “Cug” and “Vek” with the correct trait adjectives. In the first check, participants 
indicated whether they believed the words “Cug” and “Vek” to be either “positive” or 
“negative”. In the second check, participants wrote three words that could be used in place of 
“Cug” and three words that could be used in place of “Vek”. Having completed these tasks, 
the participant summoned the experimenter. If the participant had failure to respond to the 
tasks in a way that reflected the two verbal rules they were exposed to, the experimenter 
asked the participant to re-read the narrative and complete the memory checks again 
(however, no participants were required to do so). 
 
2.2.2.3 Post-experiment Self-Report Measures 
 
Having taken the testing IRAP, the participants in all three conditions were then asked 
to complete three pen-and-paper self-report measures, which were a set of feeling 
thermometers, two semantic-differential scales, and a meaningfulness scale. Each of the two 
feeling thermometers had an 11-point scale on its right-hand side numbered from 0˚ to 100˚ 
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in 10˚ intervals. The word “Cug” was printed above one thermometer and the word “Vek” 
above the other. Underneath the thermometers were printed instructions asking the 
participants to draw a line across each one at a point roughly in accordance with how they felt 
about the word printed above it. Unlike the thermometers used by Hughes and Barnes-
Holmes (2011), there was no reference to 0˚ being ‘cold’ and 100˚ being ‘hot’. Accordingly, 
the demands of this measure proved to be unclear to some of the participants (who asked for 
further instruction from the experimenter). The semantic-differential scales were 7-point 
Likert scales that were numbered from 1 (located just to the right of the word “negative”) on 
the left-hand side of the scale through to 7 (which was just to the left of the word “positive”) 
on the right-hand side. Each scale had either the word “Cug” or the word “Vek” printed 
above it and instructions for the participants to circle the number that best represented how 
they felt about each word. The final self-report measure was a meaningfulness scale, a 7-
point Likert scale that was numbered from 1 (which was just to the right of the phrase “Not at 
all”) on the left-hand side of the scale through to 7 (located just to the left of the word 
“Extremely”) on the right-hand side. Printed instructions underneath the scale requested that 
the participant circle the number that best reflected how meaningful they believed their 
attitudes towards the words “Cug” and “Vek” were. As was the case in Hughes and Barnes-
Holmes’s (2011) experiment, the feeling thermometers and semantic-differential scales were 
used to determine the participants’ explicit attitudes towards the previously novel stimuli and 
the meaningfulness scale was used to establish how ‘real’ the participants’ acquired attitudes 
‘felt’ to them. 
 
2.2.3 Experimental Procedures 
 
Each participant was asked to attend an individual experimental session in a room in 
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the School of Psychology at the University of Waikato. Upon arrival, the participant was 
greeted and presented with a consent form and a copy of the information sheet (which had 
also been sent to the participants prior to the experiment via email; see Appendix A). When 
the participant had read and signed the consent form they were then presented with the 
written instructions for their condition and advised to ask questions about anything they did 
not understand. The specific procedures are described in the following sections. 
 
2.2.3.1 Contingency-Learning Condition 
 
In the contingency-learning condition, the participants (n = 4) were immediately 
presented with a training IRAP in which there was only one rule to be followed (which was 
that the words “Cug” and “Vek” were either “Opposite” or “Similar” to any one of six 
positive or negative trait adjectives). The instructions on how to successfully complete the 
training programme were contained in the participants’ written instructions and read as 
follows: 
You are about to take a computer-based learning task which involves 
reading combinations of two words that are presented simultaneously on 
the screen. Your task is to state whether the words are similar in meaning 
or opposite. 
 
For each trial you will need to look at the word at the top of the screen, the 
word presented below it, and then the words “Similar” and “Opposite” 
which will be presented horizontally at the bottom of the screen. Using 
either the “d” key or the “k” key you must then choose one of the two 
words (or response options) that are presented at the bottom of the screen. 
 
When making your response, use either the index or middle finger of your 
left hand to press the “d” key and either the index or middle finger of your 
right hand to press the “k” key. 
 
The response options “Similar” and “Opposite” will not remain in the same 
place on the screen for each trial: these words will swap places in a way 
that cannot be predicted. 
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In order for you to relate the various words presented simultaneously 
above the two response-words the computer programme will provide 
feedback by telling you if you have made an incorrect response. An 
incorrect response is indicated by the presentation of a red cross. 
 
It is important that you make few errors and respond as quickly as 
you can. To do this, try to focus on accurate responding first and 
foremost; when you are giving a correct response on the majority of 
the trials, try to speed up your responding until you taking as little 
time to relate the words as possible. 
 
Go well! 
 
Please press the space bar to continue with the learning task and summon 
the experimenter when prompted to do so. 
 
When the participant had read the instructions and pressed the space bar they were 
presented with an on-screen statement which advised them that an incorrect response would 
result in a red cross being shown and that only a correct response would allow them to 
proceed to the next trial. Having once again pressed the space bar, the participant was then 
presented with the first combination of stimuli, which featured a sample stimulus (which was 
either the word “Cug” or the word “Vek”), one of the trait adjectives as a target stimulus, and 
the two response options including an instruction as to which key to press to select them (see 
Figure 2.1 for how these stimuli were positioned on-screen). The participant then had to press 
one of the two response keys without knowing which one produced the correct response. 
However, as the participant proceeded through the blocks of training trials, feedback was 
given in accordance with the particular rule at play. There were between one and eight 
training blocks available to the participants. If a participant did not respond in a way that met 
the required response criteria by the end of the eighth trial block they were thanked for their 
involvement and presented with a course-credit slip. Participants who successfully completed 
the training IRAP were asked to read the next set of written instructions while the test 
programme was loaded onto the laptop. The instructions for completing the test IRAP read as 
follows: 
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You are about to take a computer-based test that is similar in appearance to 
the computer-based learning task that you took earlier. 
 
As before, the computer programme will ask you to follow a rule which will 
become apparent through the feedback that is given following each incorrect 
response. 
 
At some points in the following test the feedback provided will make sense 
to you; at other points, the feedback will contradict what you have 
previously learnt. This is part of the task and you will be required to respond 
in different ways. 
 
It is important that you make few errors and respond as quickly as you 
can. To do this, try to focus on accurate responding first and foremost; 
when you are giving a correct response in the majority of the trials, try 
to speed up your responding until you taking as little time to relate the 
words as possible. 
 
Go well! 
 
Please press the space bar to continue with the test and summon the 
experimenter when prompted to do so. 
 
To expose the participants to the trial blocks in which they were asked to respond in 
way that was in disagreement with what they had earlier learnt, the testing IRAP contained a 
series of practice blocks in which feedback was provided for both consistent and inconsistent 
responding (across alternating blocks of 48 trials). This was necessary because without such 
an exposure the participants in the contingency-learning condition would have had no prior 
experience of responding in a way that contradicted what they had learnt during the training 
procedure (and so would have responded poorly on the inconsistent trial blocks during the 
testing phase). If a participant had failed to meet the response criteria during the practice 
phase, they would have been thanked and their involvement in the experiment would have 
been finished; however, no participants in this condition failed to successfully complete the 
practice blocks within the allotted amount. When the participants finished the testing IRAP 
they were asked to complete the three self-report measures before being thanked for their 
participation and reminded of their next session time. 
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2.2.3.2 Verbal-Instruction Condition 
 
Participants (n = 4) in the verbal-instruction condition were given a printed copy of 
the written narrative. Having read the narrative, the participants were asked to complete a 
series of memory checks which the experimenter inspected to make sure the answers were 
congruent with the experimental manipulation. If a participant had responded to the questions 
in a way that suggested they had not acquired the two verbal rules present in the narrative, 
they would have been asked to re-read it and complete the memory check a second time 
(however, none of the participants were required to re-read the narrative). The final part of 
the experiment involved the participants taking a testing IRAP that was identical to the one 
that was presented to the participants in the contingency-learning condition. The same 
response criteria applied through the practice phase of the testing programme with one 
participant failing to meet the required standards for accuracy and speed (they were thanked 
for their involvement in the experiment and provided with a course-credit slip; the 
participant’s data was also removed from the later analysis). When they had finished the 
testing IRAP, the remaining participants in the verbal-instruction condition were then asked 
to complete the three hard-copy self-report measures before being thanked for their 
participation and reminded of their next session time. 
 
2.2.3.3 Combined-Learning Condition 
 
Participants (n = 4) in the combined-learning condition were presented with the 
attitude-induction procedures that were used in the contingency-learning and verbal-
instruction conditions. They were first presented with the written narrative and its associated 
memory checks before being asked to take the training IRAP that was used in the 
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contingency-learning condition and then the same testing IRAP that was used in the other two 
conditions. Having successfully completed the testing programme and the self-report 
measures, the participants were thanked and reminded of their next session time. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
Transformation of raw data. The IRAP programme records the time it takes for a 
test user to relate two or more stimuli in multiple discrete trials. As Hughes and Barnes-
Holmes (2011) state, to account for individual differences, the raw latency scores can be 
transformed into D-IRAP scores (something which the IRAP software does automatically; 
Barnes-Holmes & Hussey, 2015). This transformation allows for test data to be analysed 
without the need to factor in a broad range of extraneous variables (such as age or cognitive 
ability; Dawson et al., 2009; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). Furthermore, the D-IRAP 
scores can be used to produce group mean scores for each attitude-induction condition and 
each pair of test blocks. 
Accuracy Criterion. In order to confirm that the participants were responding in 
accordance with the rule at play, the accuracy criterion was set at 80% for the testing IRAPs 
used in all three conditions. However, three of the participants (one in the Verbal-Instruction 
Group and two in the Combined-Learning Group) attained accuracy scores just below 80% in 
some of their trial blocks (overall, there were five trial blocks in which the minimum-
accuracy criterion was not met: three consistent trial blocks and two inconsistent trial blocks). 
Accordingly, the minimum-accuracy level was lowered to 79% after the event with any 
scores below that being discarded from the analysis (the data from one pair of trial blocks in 
the verbal-instruction condition were removed on this basis). 
Formation and persistence of differential relational responding. As Figure 2.2 
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indicates, the three attitude-induction conditions produced differential relational responding 
with the participants reacting faster on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials. A 3 
(contingency-learning, verbal-instruction, combined-learning) x 3 (1st, 2nd, and 3rd pair of test 
blocks) repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that there was no significant effect for attitude-
induction condition, F(2, 2) = .04, p = .96, and no significant effect for the pair of test blocks, 
F(2,2) = 14.78, p = .06; furthermore, there was no significant interaction between the pair of 
test blocks and the attitude-induction condition, F(4, 4) = .18, p = .9. The absence of any 
significant effect may be due to the small number of participants and the substantial amount 
of variance within the group data (particularly in the 2nd pair of trial blocks in the verbal-
instruction condition). In order to account for these limitations and any missing values (for 
those trial blocks in which the accuracy criterion was not met), the data for the 1st and 2nd trial 
blocks were combined in order to create two levels: (1) trial blocks 1 to 4 (‘early’ trial 
blocks), and, (2) trial blocks 5 & 6 (‘late’ trial blocks). Accordingly, a 3 (contingency-
learning, verbal-instruction, combined-learning) x 2 (‘early’ trial blocks, ‘late’ trial blocks) 
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted which indicated that there was no 
significant effect for attitude-induction condition, F(2, 8) = .38, p = .70, r = .29, no 
significant effect for time/trial block, F(1, 8) = .003, p = .96, r = 0, and no significant 
interaction between attitude-induction condition and time/trial block, F(2, 8) = 1.23, p = .34, 
r = .48. The observed power was also very low for the attitude-induction (.092) and time/trial 
block (.05) effects, meaning that if there were real effects due to these manipulations they 
would only be detected 9% and 5% of the time, respectively. 
One of the aims of Experiment 1 was to see whether there was any weakening of the 
‘IRAP effects’ across the three pairs of test blocks. A visual inspection of Figure 2.2 will 
indicate that there was no substantial decrease in the differential responding performed by the 
participants in the three attitude-induction conditions. Indeed, the Verbal-Instruction Group 
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produced stronger ‘IRAP effects’ as the testing IRAP progressed. Furthermore, the 3 x 2 
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA produced a series of estimated marginal means that show 
a decrease in the D-IRAP scores over time for the contingency-learning and combined-
learning conditions but an increase in the D-IRAP scores for the verbal-instruction condition. 
 
Figure 2.2. The mean D-IRAP scores for the three attitude-induction conditions in Experiment 
1. If the mean D-IRAP score is above or below zero, then there was a bias in participant 
responding that may represent the presence of an implicit attitude. Standard error bars reflect 
the standard error of the mean. 
 
Affirmation and negation trial types. As part of their analysis, Hughes and Barnes-
Holmes (2011) compared the mean D-IRAP scores of the trials in which the participants were 
asked to affirm the proposed stimulus relation within a particular trial and the mean D-IRAP 
scores of the trials in which the participants were asked to negate the proposed stimulus 
relation. As Figure 2.3 portrays, there was little difference in the mean D-IRAP scores in 
Experiment 1; indeed, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that there was no 
significant effect for trial type, F(1, 10) = .64, p = .44. 
 65 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The mean D-IRAP scores for the trial types in which the participants were required 
to affirm the rule at play and the mean D-IRAP scores for the trials in which they were required 
to negate it. Standard error bars reflect the standard error of the mean. 
 
Explicit Attitudes. Two of the participants in Experiment 1 failed to respond on the 
post-test feeling thermometers in a way that was consistent with the attitude-induction 
process they had undergone. These participants were both in the contingency-learning 
condition. In their study, Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2011, p. 402) discarded the data for 
participants who “failed to produce self-reported attitudes that were consistent with the 
induction procedures”. However, given the limited number of participants in my experiment, 
the two participants’ IRAP data was retained in order for analyses of variance to be 
conducted. The data was also retained for a single participant in the combined-learning 
condition who rated the sample stimuli “Cug” and “Vek” equally on both the feeling 
thermometers and the semantic-differential scales. Furthermore, one participant in the verbal-
instruction condition took their written instructions home so their self-report data was lost. 
Using the data produced by the feeling thermometers, a 2 (word valence) x 3 (contingency-
learning, verbal-instruction, combined-learning) mixed repeated-measures ANOVA indicated 
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that there was no significant effect for valence, F(1, 2) = 3.15, p = .22, and induction 
condition, F(2, 4) = .42, p = .68, and no significant interaction between induction condition 
and word valence, F(2, 4) = 2.41, p = .28. A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
data from the induction-conditions collapsed indicated that there was a significant effect for 
word valence, F(1, 10) = 7.14, p = .023, which suggests that, despite there being no 
significant effect for the method used, exposure to any one of the attitude-induction 
procedures tended to produce an explicit evaluation. 
In the ten pairs of semantic differential scales that were retained by the experimenter, 
80% of the participants in Experiment 1 assigned a score at the midpoint or higher for the 
sample stimulus that had been related to positive trait adjectives or nouns within their 
attitude-induction procedure. Conversely, 60% of the participants assigned a score at the 
midpoint or lower for the sample stimulus that had been related to negative trait adjectives or 
nouns within their attitude-induction procedure. 
Only 36% of the participants rated the meaningfulness of their attitudes towards the 
words “Cug” and “Vek” at or above the midpoint of the meaningfulness scale. However, in 
Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011, p. 402) experiment, 71% of the participants rated the 
“perceived realism” of their attitudes at or above the midpoint (indicating that there may have 
been an important difference in how the two self-report measures and their accompanying 
instructions were worded). Despite there being a limited number of participants within each 
group, there was an interesting trend in the data from the meaningfulness scales: in the 
contingency-learning condition, 25% of the participants rated the meaningfulness of their 
attitudes at or above the midpoint, with 37% of participants in the verbal-instruction 
condition and 50% of the participants in the combined-learning condition responding in a 
similar manner. 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to see if there was a weakening in the participants’ 
differential relational responding that was similar to the attenuation observed in Hughes and 
Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) study. In order to replicate the conditions in which such a 
weakening could occur, it was first necessary to evoke biased relational responding using a 
series of attitude-induction procedures. As Figure 2.2 shows, the contingency-learning, 
verbal-instruction, and combined-learning procedures produced ‘IRAP effects’ across all 
three pairs of trial blocks. These ‘IRAP effects’ occur whenever a mean D-IRAP score is 
above or below zero, with a positive value indicating faster responding during consistent trial 
blocks and a negative value indicating faster responding during inconsistent trial blocks. With 
the mean D-IRAP scores ranging from 0.11 to 0.41, the ‘IRAP effects’ in my experiment 
were broadly as strong as those recorded by Hughes and Barnes-Holmes. However, there was 
greater variance in my data which brings into question the significance of my results. 
Furthermore, in my experiment there was no evident weakening in the ‘IRAP effects’ across 
the three pairs of trial blocks in all three attitude-induction conditions, an outcome that 
contradicts the findings of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes. 
The absence of any weakening in the ‘IRAP effects’ indicates that there was a 
robustness to the implicit attitudes that were induced in my experiment (or, more accurately, 
there was a robustness to the differential relational responding from which the presence of 
such attitudes are inferred). Indeed, within my application of the testing IRAP there was an 
equal number of opportunities for the participants to acquire the opposite relational rule as 
there were opportunities for a restatement of the original rule to be deemed ‘correct’. Yet the 
engineered response bias persisted throughout the six trial blocks of the testing IRAP despite 
the intermittent reinforcement of contradictory relational behaviour. A possible cognitivist 
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explanation for the persistence of the differential relational responding would be that once 
formed, each implicit attitude remained as a stable mental entity and the response bias was 
evidence of that entity (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; McGuire, 1985). When considered in 
associative-conditioning terms, the re-occurring ‘IRAP effects’ may be evidence of a series 
of strong mental associations that supported fast relational responding even when joined by a 
series of secondary associations that were formed through exposure to the competing 
contingency (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). 
In purely functional terms, the engineered response bias may have persisted simply 
because the ‘correct’ relational behaviour (which was fast, accurate responding in accordance 
with the rule at play) received more reinforcement than an ‘incorrect’ alternative response 
over time (making the ‘correct’ behaviour more likely to occur). Furthermore, when the 
participants were exposed to the contingency in which the alternative relational response 
became part of the ‘correct’ behaviour, they could still produce the alternative response (and 
received reinforcement for doing so), but not as readily as if they had been asked to emit the 
original ‘correct’ response that was so heavily reinforced within the training phase of the 
experiment (in at least two of the attitude-induction conditions). However, if the ‘IRAP 
effects’ were solely a product of differential reinforcement over time, there should have been 
no strong response bias performed by the participants in the verbal-instruction condition 
(which, as Figure 2.2 indicates, was not the case), as they were exposed to identical amounts 
of the two contingencies and were not presented with a training IRAP. So it is possible that, 
in accordance with the REC Model (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012), 
the ‘IRAP effects’ actually resulted from the performance of two different types of evaluative 
cognitive-behaviour: (1) the brief-and-immediate relational responding that was performed 
during the consistent trial blocks, and, (2) the elaborate and more time-consuming relational 
responding required in order to affirm or negate a stated relation in accordance with a verbal 
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rule that is a reversal of another rule. 
The main limitation of my experiment was the small number of participants in each 
attitude-induction condition (n = 4 in each). Furthermore, there were substantially fewer 
participants in my experiment overall (n = 12) than in Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) 
study (n = 64). As well as the limited number of participants in each group, the need to 
remove data for the trial blocks in which the minimum-accuracy criterion was not met meant 
that the results could not be analysed using some tests of statistical significance. For example, 
it was not possible to directly compare group variance when the data for a particular group 
contained only a single value (as was the case in the verbal-instruction condition of my 
experiment). Accordingly, the results of the various ANOVAs should be considered with 
caution. 
As a strict replication, my experiment may also be limited by the way in which the 
participants were exposed to a different written narrative, a different set of target stimuli, and 
a different set of written instructions to those used in Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) 
study. When it comes to replicating research on arbitrarily-applicable relational responding, 
similarities in experimental materials and stimuli matter because there may be significant 
differences between the relational responding that occurs in the presence of one word and the 
relational responding that occurs in the presence of another. For example, there may be 
stronger differential responding when sample stimuli are paired with emotionally-laden 
adjectives such as “delightful” than when they are paired with emotionally-neutral adjectives 
such as “nice”. Similarly, a commonly used word such as “nice” may produce faster 
responding through familiarity and meaningfulness than a relatively unknown synonym such 
as “congenial”. In order to address this limitation, a future study could look at how synonyms 
influence differential relational responding. 
In summary, the participants in my experiment were able to relationally respond 
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within the competing contingencies in a way that suggested the presence of implicit attitudes. 
Furthermore, this experiment supports the use of the IRAP as a way of inducing biased 
relational responding (and hence implicit attitudes) using novel stimuli. However, within my 
replication of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) experiment there was no weakening of 
the ‘IRAP effects’, which indicates a certain level of persistence in the engineered response 
biases. Accordingly, a second experiment was conducted in order to find out just how 
persistent the induced response biases were. 
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Chapter 3 
Experiment 2: An Extension of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) Study 
of Induced Implicit Attitudes 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that differential relational responding can be 
engineered and then accessed using the IRAP. Furthermore, given certain key assumptions, it 
is also possible to infer the presence of an engineered implicit attitude from such biased 
responding. However, my first experiment did not see a repeat of the weakening in the ‘IRAP 
effects’ observed by Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2011). Indeed, the lack of any attenuation 
in the differential relational responding suggests that the engineered biases were both 
persistent across time and resistant to the influence of the IRAP’s alternating contingencies. 
Yet the testing IRAP can be administered in under 20 min, which is possibly too short a 
timescale to confirm with certainty the longevity and robustness of recently acquired 
cognitive-behaviour. Accordingly, within my thesis work there was a need for the 
participants’ relational responding to be assessed again following an extended period in 
which they had not been exposed to the experimental stimuli, instructions, and materials and 
the testing procedure itself (including the contingencies that are present within it). 
If implicit attitudes are assumed to be valid psychological constructs, their persistence 
raises questions about how such evaluations are stored and how resistant they are to change. 
Indeed, there are some who believe that implicit attitudes remain stable over time while 
others assert that implicit attitudes are ever-changing acts of automatic cognition (Gregg et 
al., 2006; Hughes et al., 2011; Schwarz, 2008). Although there is some support for the 
stability of implicit cognition (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Ranganath & Nosek, 2006), 
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the malleability of implicit attitudes makes logical sense when one considers the ongoing 
need a human has to appraise the environment in a way that is adaptable (Albarracín et al., 
2005). Accordingly, an implicit attitude may not persist as some form of enduring mental 
quality but as the heightened probability of a particular evaluative behaviour occurring in 
response to a particular stimulus (Hughes et al., 2012). In other words, an implicit attitude 
may reoccur (i.e., persist) simply because it is a behaviour that has been performed and 
reinforced under broadly similar conditions in the past, which is something that may happen 
when implicit attitudes are trained and then tested using the IRAP. 
One further explanation for the persistence of implicit attitudes is offered by the REC 
Model (Barnes-Holmes et al., 2010; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). 
Within this account of human evaluative behaviour and cognition, implicit attitudes are 
defined as being behavioural acts in which stimuli are related within individual relational 
frames and more expansive relational networks (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et 
al., 2012). Accordingly, the persistence of an implicit attitude may be due to the ongoing 
presence of the attitude object within ‘online’ relational framing. To illustrate this point with 
a fictional example, following my first experiment, one of the participants in my research 
may have experienced a cognitive-behavioural event in which they automatically placed the 
word “virtuous” in a frame of co-ordination with the word “Cug” having heard the word 
“virtuous” spoken at a dinner party. The same participant may then have proceeded to relate 
the word “Cug” with other verbal stimuli, such as “good”, “similar”, and “experiment”. For 
the individual who engages in such relational responding, the implicit attitude is more likely 
to continue over time (and into the second experimental session). Indeed, the ‘strength’ of the 
individual’s evaluation of the word “Cug” may even increase as the word enters into 
progressively more elaborate networks of stimulus relations and a greater number of 
relational frames (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). Conversely, a 
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participant who, having taken part in the first experiment, did not then perform any relational 
responses that included the word “Cug” may have lost their implicit attitude to the sample 
stimulus as a result. So, in accordance with the REC interpretation of the attitude construct, 
the persistence of implicit attitudes may actually be the repetition of relational behaviour over 
time. 
Having replicated Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) study in my first experiment, 
I undertook a second experiment after a waiting period of five days. The aims of my second 
experiment were (1) to find out whether the response biases that were engineered in 
Experiment 1 persisted beyond the time it took to conduct the first testing IRAP (in 
Experiment 2a), and, (2) to find out whether the persistent response biases were strengthened 
by further training (Experiment 2b). Accordingly, the participants that were involved in 
Experiment 1 were asked to attend a second session in which their implicit relational 
responding was assessed using a testing IRAP that was identical to the one used in the earlier 
experiment. The participants were then exposed to the same training procedure that they 
encountered during the first experiment before being presented with the same testing IRAP. 
 
3.2 Method 
 
In order to determine how persistent the engineered response biases were after five 
days of non-exposure to either the written materials or the IRAP programme, Experiment 2 
began with an application of the testing IRAP to all the participants regardless of which 
experimental condition they were in. Having had their (experimentally unrevised) relational 
responding accessed and recorded in Experiment 2a, the participants were then exposed to 
identical written materials and identical training and testing procedures to the ones they had 
encountered five days earlier (Experiment 2b). In order to keep the experimental session 
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times to under an hour, there was no re-administration of the feeling thermometers, semantic-
differential scales, and meaningfulness scales that were deployed at the end of the first 
experiment. However, this planned shortening of the various experimental procedures was 
not actually required as the participants all completed the two testing IRAPs and the 
intervening training in under 30 min. 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
 
The participants (n = 11) for Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1 (less the 
one participant who did not meet the accuracy criterion during the practice phase of the 
testing IRAP in the first experiment). Upon arrival each participant was shown a copy of the 
consent form they had signed at the start of Experiment 1 and a copy of the information sheet 
before being given the written instructions for the particular condition they were in. To allow 
for the direct comparison of experimental data, the participants remained in the same 
condition they had been randomly assigned to in Experiment 1; this between-experiment 
consistency extended to the ordering of consistent and inconsistent trial blocks in the first 
administration of the IRAP, with those exposed to inconsistent trials blocks first in 
Experiment 1 having to respond ‘inconsistently’ first in Experiment 2a and those given 
consistent trials blocks first in Experiment 1 having to first respond in accordance with what 
they had earlier learnt. Furthermore, this fixed ordering of the trial blocks continued during 
the final administration of the IRAP (which took place after the retraining phase of the 
experiment). 
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3.2.2 Materials and Equipment 
 
Aside from the non-administration of the three post-experimental self-report 
measures, in all three attitude-induction conditions, the training and testing procedures were 
identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
 
3.2.3 Experimental Procedures 
 
The participants in all three attitude-induction conditions began Experiment 2 by re-
taking the testing IRAP that they had completed in Experiment 1. Having successfully 
completed the test (Experiment 2a), the participants were exposed to the same attitude-
induction procedures that they had undergone at the first session. All three training 
procedures were identical to the ones used during Experiment 1. 
When they had taken the attitude-induction training for the second time in 5 days, the 
participants in all three experimental conditions were then asked to complete a testing IRAP 
(Experiment 2b). This final assessment of the participants’ differential relational responding 
was identical to both the testing programme they had taken at the start of the session and the 
testing programme that they had taken 5 days earlier. When they had completed the last 
IRAP, the participants were thanked for their involvement in the experiment and were either 
given a course-credit slip or a lottery ticket for a prize draw. 
 
3.3 Results 
 
Accuracy Criterion. In order to confirm that the participants were responding in 
accordance with the rule at play, the accuracy criterion was originally set at 80% for the 
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testing IRAPs used in all three conditions. However, four of the participants (three in the 
Verbal-Instruction Group and one in the Combined-Learning Group) attained accuracy scores 
below 80% in some of their trial blocks for Experiment 2a; furthermore, one of the 
participants in the Combined-Learning Group did not meet the accuracy criterion in one of 
the trial blocks of Experiment 2b. So in Experiment 2a and Experiment 2b, there were five 
trial blocks in which the minimum-accuracy criterion was not met (with all five blocks being 
inconsistent trial blocks). Accordingly, the minimum-accuracy level was lowered to 79% 
after the event, with any scores below that being discarded from the analysis (the data from 
one pair of trial blocks in the combined-learning condition and three pairs of trial blocks in 
the verbal-instruction condition were removed on this basis from Experiment 2a, with 
Experiment 2b losing the data from one pair of trial blocks in the verbal-instruction 
condition). 
Formation and persistence of differential relational responding. 
Experiment 2a. As Figure 3.1 indicates, the participants in the three attitude-
induction conditions produced differential responding with the participants reacting faster on 
consistent trials than on inconsistent trials in all but two of the pairs of test blocks. I could not 
run a 3 (contingency-learning, verbal-instruction, combined-learning) x 3 (1st, 2nd, and 3rd pair 
of test blocks) repeated-measures ANOVA for Experiment 2a as one of the pairs of test 
blocks for the verbal-instruction condition contained only one datum (the other data had been 
removed from the analysis). So in order to account for the missing values (for those trial 
blocks in which the accuracy criterion was not met), the data for the 1st and 2nd trial blocks 
were combined in order to create two levels: (1) trial blocks 1 to 4 (‘early’ trial blocks), and, 
(2) trial blocks 5 & 6 (‘late’ trial blocks). Accordingly, a 3 (contingency-learning, verbal-
instruction, combined-learning) x 2 (‘early’ trial blocks, ‘late’ trial blocks) mixed repeated-
measures ANOVA was conducted which indicated that there was no significant effect for 
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attitude-induction condition, F(2, 8) = .91, p = .44, r = .43, and no significant interaction 
between attitude-induction condition and time/trial block, F(2, 8) = .69, p = .53, r = .38. 
However, there was a significant effect for time/trial block, F(1, 8) = 5.82, p = .04, r = .65. 
The observed power was very low for the attitude-induction effect (.16) and the interaction 
between attitude-induction and time/trial block effect (.13), meaning that if there were real 
effects they would only be detected 16% and 13% of the time, respectively. The observed 
power was still fairly low for the significant effect for time/trial block (.56) but the effect size 
was large (r = .65). 
A visual inspection of Figure 3.1 will indicate that there was a substantial decrease in 
the biased relational responding performed by the participants in the contingency-learning and 
verbal-instruction conditions. Indeed, the 5th and 6th test blocks saw a reversal of the ‘IRAP 
effects’ that were recorded in the first two pairs of blocks for these conditions. Furthermore, 
the 3-x-2 mixed repeated-measures ANOVA produced a series of estimated marginal means 
that indicated a decrease in the D-IRAP scores over time for all three conditions. This means 
that despite the mid-test increase in differential responding by the participants in the combined-
learning condition, there was still a decrease in the response bias shown by these participants 
over time. 
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Figure 3.1. The mean D-IRAP scores for the three attitude-induction conditions in the first 
testing phase of Experiment 2. If the mean D-IRAP score is above or below zero, then there 
was a bias in participant responding that may represent the presence of an implicit attitude. 
Standard error bars reflect the standard error of the mean. 
 
Experiment 2b. As Figure 3.2 portrays, the participants in the three attitude-
induction conditions produced differential relational responding throughout the test with the 
participants reacting faster on consistent trials than on inconsistent trials in all but one of the 
pairs of test blocks. In order to account for the values missing from the trial blocks in which 
the accuracy criterion was not met, the data from Experiment 2b underwent the same 
‘chunking’ as occurred with the data from Experiment 2a. Accordingly, a 3 (contingency-
learning, verbal-instruction, combined-learning) x 2 (‘early’ trial blocks, ‘late’ trial blocks) 
mixed repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted which indicated that there was no 
significant effect for attitude-induction condition, F(2, 8) = 1.66, p = .25, r = .54, no 
significant effect for time/trial block, F(1, 8) = .31, p = .59, r = .19, and no significant 
interaction between attitude-induction condition and time/trial block, F(2, 8) = .14, p = .87, r 
= .18. The observed power was also very low for the attitude-induction (.25), time/trial block 
(.08), and the interaction between attitude-induction condition and time/trial block (.07) 
effects, meaning that if there were real effects they would only be detected 25%, 8%, and 7% 
of the time, respectively. 
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A visual inspection of Figure 3.2 will indicate that there was no decrease in the biased 
relational responding performed by the participants in the contingency-learning condition. 
Indeed, the ‘IRAP effects’ increased across the pairs of test blocks in the contingency-learning 
condition. Furthermore, the ‘IRAP effects’ were generally weaker in Experiment 2b than those 
recorded in Experiment 2a. 
 
Figure 3.2. The mean D-IRAP scores for the three attitude-induction conditions in the second 
testing phase of Experiment 2. If the mean D-IRAP score is above or below zero, then there 
was a bias in participant responding that may represent the presence of an implicit attitude. 
Standard error bars reflect the standard error of the mean. 
 
Affirmation and negation trial types. Figure 3.3 (Experiment 2a) and Figure 3.4 
(Experiment 2b) portray the mean D-IRAP scores of the trials in which the participants were 
asked to affirm the proposed stimulus relation and the mean D-IRAP scores of the trials in 
which the participants were asked to negate the proposed stimulus relation. A visual inspection 
of these two figures will reveal a substantial decrease in differential responding on negation 
trials across the two experiments. Indeed, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that 
there was no significant effect for trial type in Experiment 2a, F(1, 10) = .48, p = .5; yet a 
second one-way repeated-measures ANOVA indicated that there was a significant effect for 
trial type in Experiment 2b, F (1, 10) = 16.82, p = .002. 
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Figure 3.3. The mean D-IRAP scores for the Experiment 2a trial types in which the participants 
were required to affirm the rule at play and the mean D-IRAP scores for the trials in which they 
were required to negate it. Standard error bars reflect the standard error of the mean. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The mean D-IRAP scores for the Experiment 2b trial types in which the participants 
were required to affirm the rule at play and the mean D-IRAP scores for the trials in which they 
were required to negate it. Standard error bars reflect the standard error of the mean. 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Experiment 2a was conducted in order to see if the response biases that were 
engineered in Experiment 1 persisted after five days. Having presented the participants with 
the first testing IRAP (Experiment 2a), the participants were then given the same attitude-
induction procedure that they had been asked to take in Experiment 1. The retraining phase 
was then followed immediately by Experiment 2b, which was a second application of the 
testing IRAP conducted in order to find out if the retraining procedures had altered the 
participants’ differential relational responding. As Figure 3.1 portrays, the participants in 
Experiment 2a continued to perform differential relational responding with ‘IRAP effects’ 
occurring in all three pairs of test blocks for all three conditions. As was the case in Hughes 
and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) experiment, there was no significant effect for attitude-
induction condition in Experiment 2a; there was, however, a significant effect for time/trial 
blocks, with the level of differential responding decreasing from early to late trial blocks. 
Accordingly, Experiment 2a successfully recreates the weakening of the ‘IRAP effects’ that 
was observed by Hughes and Barnes-Holmes. Furthermore, the weakening continued until 
the ‘IRAP effects’ were reversed in the final pair of test blocks for the contingency-learning 
and verbal-instruction conditions. This reversal means that the participants within these 
conditions were responding faster on inconsistent trials than on consistent trials. 
There were no significant effects for attitude-induction method or time/trial blocks in 
Experiment 2b. The recorded ‘IRAP effects’ were also smaller than the ‘effects’ recorded in 
the two other tests. Furthermore, there was a reversal of the ‘IRAP effect’ in the middle block 
of the verbal-instruction condition with the participants responding faster on inconsistent 
trials than on consistent trials. The relatively weak ‘IRAP effects’ and the single reversal in 
differential responding is of particular interest because both response phenomena happened 
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after the retraining phase of Experiment 2. Indeed, it should be expected that after the re-
application of the attitude-induction procedures, the ‘IRAP effects’ would be strengthened or 
at least returned to a positive value (for those ‘effects’ that had been reversed in Experiment 
2a). Yet rather than echo the clear and persistent differential responding of Experiment 1, the 
results of Experiment 2b indicate the presence of more complex patterns of behaviour. 
The results of Experiment 2a indicate that the response biases engineered in 
Experiment 1 persisted over five days. This conclusion is made because there would have 
been little opportunity for the participants to rehearse the multiple stimulus relations away 
from the experimental setting (other than through their own cognitive-behaviour) and 
certainly no opportunity to receive reinforcement or negative feedback for doing so. 
Furthermore, the participants received no exposure to either the sample or target stimuli in 
the second session until the first testing IRAP of Experiment 2a. However, as is the case with 
any application of the testing IRAP, the participants were asked to complete a series of 
practice blocks before Experiment 2a began. Indeed, the pre-test exposure to the various 
stimuli across multiple trial blocks may have reactivated the response biases (and any implicit 
attitudes) before they were accessed and recorded by the testing IRAP. Accordingly, it may 
be worth recreating my two experiments without the practice blocks in Experiment 2a. It may 
also be inappropriate to confirm the persistence of the engineered implicit attitudes without 
this additional research being done. 
A limitation to Experiment 2 is that one of the participants had the written instructions 
in their possession for the five days between the two sessions. While it is possible that the 
instructions were not looked at, it is also possible that the participant re-read the written 
narrative along with their answers to the memory checks and self-report measures. If this 
additional exposure did happen, then the participant’s revision of the various stimulus relations 
may have produced an appreciable outcome in an experiment with such a small number of 
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participants. Accordingly, although no additional analysis was made of the participant’s data, 
it is possible that exposure to the written instructions produced a significant effect in the 
participant’s differential relational responding when compared to the rest of their group. 
One further limitation with Experiment 2 concerns the lack of any measurement of the 
participants’ explicit-attitudes. The self-report measures that were used in Experiment 1 were 
not included in the second experiment to save time for the participants, who were charged 
with completing two testing IRAPs and one training procedure within an hour. However, all 
the participants completed Experiments 2a and 2b within 30 min, meaning that there was a 
missed opportunity to further determine the participants’ explicit attitudes towards the sample 
stimuli. Indeed, it would have been valuable to know whether, having taken two testing 
IRAPs and a training procedure, the participants still held explicit attitudes that were 
congruent with their implicit evaluations. Furthermore, given that there were two participants 
in Experiment 1 who did not respond in accordance with the training procedure, it is not 
certain that the participants would have expressed explicit attitudes that agreed with what 
they had been taught. 
In summary, the participants in Experiment 2a continued to show biased relational 
responding to the sample stimuli even though five days had passed since they had last been 
exposed to them. However, the participants’ biased relational responding diminished through 
Experiment 2a’s three pairs of testing blocks until those in the contingency-learning and 
verbal-instruction conditions were responding faster on inconsistent trials than on consistent 
trials. Experiment 2b produced ‘IRAP effects’ across all test blocks in all attitude-induction 
conditions; however, the effects were weaker than those observed in Experiment 2a and there 
was a reversal in the ‘IRAP effect’ within the verbal-instruction condition. The results 
indicate that there is a level of persistence to the response biases (and hence implicit 
attitudes) that are engineered using the IRAP and a written narrative, but the engineered 
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biases are not necessarily strengthened by re-exposure to any particular attitude-induction 
procedure. 
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Chapter 4 
General Discussion 
 
The aims of this thesis were: (a) to find out if the weakening of the ‘IRAP effects’ in 
Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) study occurred again during a strict replication 
(Experiment 1), (b) to find out whether the response biases that were engineered in Experiment 
1 persisted beyond the time it took to conduct the first testing IRAP (Experiment 2a), and, (c) 
to find out whether any persistent response biases were strengthened by further training 
(Experiment 2b). 
The results of Experiment 1 show that biased relational responding can be engineered 
using the IRAP. There was, however, no weakening in the ‘IRAP effects’ of Experiment 1 
despite the participants being exposed to competing contingencies in the testing IRAP. The 
results of Experiment 2a indicate that the response biases that were engineered in Experiment 
1 persisted into the testing IRAP that was conducted five days after the first session. 
Furthermore, the response-bias attenuation that was observed in Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s 
(2011) study occurred within my second experiment, with the last block of test trials containing 
two reverse ‘IRAP effects’. Retraining the participants using several attitude-induction 
procedures produced definite differential responding in Experiment 2b, although there was a 
reverse bias in one of the trial blocks for one of the conditions and the recorded ‘IRAP effects’ 
were generally weaker than those observed in Experiments 1 and 2a. 
The results of my two experiments support the use of the IRAP as a measure of 
differential relational responding that can also be used to induce implicit and explicit 
cognitive behaviour (in the guise of either brief-and-immediate or extended-and-elaborated 
relational responses; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). Indeed, despite 
the lack of significance in the majority of the observed response biases, there were positive 
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‘IRAP effects’ in 24 of the 27 available pairs of test blocks. Furthermore, the presence of a 
negative response bias does not signify the failure to produce an ‘IRAP effect’; rather it 
indicates a shift in the predominant pattern of relational responding. Given the alternating 
contingencies at play (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011), there is always the potential for 
participants to respond faster on inconsistent trial blocks than on consistent trial blocks 
(which produces a negative ‘IRAP effect’). But whether or not this means that the 
participants’ implicit attitudes change during such reversals in response bias depends upon 
how the biased responding is interpreted. If relational responses are proxies for an underlying 
attitude, then clearly the attitude is altered with any change in response bias. However, shifts 
in differential responding can be explained in purely functional terms without any need to 
reference the attitude construct (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011; Hughes et al., 2011; 
Hughes et al., 2012). For example, each trial within an inconsistent trial block requires the 
participant to relate the sample and target stimuli in a way that is oppositional to what they 
know (e.g., having to state that “Cug” is “Similar” to “Virtuous” when they have been trained 
to relate “Vek” with “Virtuous”). Yet this elaborated relational response is a behavioural act 
which is likely to become easier to perform with practice. Accordingly, it stands to reason 
that as more inconsistent trial blocks are presented, the participants are able to speed up their 
extended-and-elaborated relational responding to the point that it may even negate an earlier 
response bias (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013; Hughes et al., 2012). 
Although the IRAP is capable of assessing new and pre-existing relational response 
biases, exposure to the procedure may alter the very evaluations that are being accessed. 
Indeed, by presenting multiple reversals of the relational rule at play, the IRAP is able to 
influence the arbitrarily-applicable relational responding from which the presence or absence 
of an implicit attitude is inferred (Hayes et al., 2011; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). For 
example, a participant may understand the word “Vek” to be “Similar” to the word 
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“Virtuous” on an implicit level, yet if the participant were to have this learned verbal 
behaviour tested using the IRAP, for 50% of the testing trials they would be given negative 
feedback (i.e. a red “X”) if they agreed with the learned rule (that the word “Vek” is 
“Similar” to word “Virtuous”) and for the other 50% of the trials they would be given 
positive feedback (i.e., progress) if they responded in a way that disagreed with that same 
rule. So it stands to reason that any pre-existing bias in relational responding would be 
lessened in the face of such competing (and oppositional) contingencies, which could explain 
why the ‘IRAP effects’ appeared to weaken in both my Experiment 2a and Hughes and 
Barnes-Holmes’s (2011) study. Accordingly, the IRAP may be an effective measure of 
relational response biases during a limited number of trial blocks, but with extended use it 
may overly influence the behaviour it is intended to access and measure. 
The IRAP’s alternating contingencies may also limit the persistence of the same 
differential responding the procedure was used to engineer. This assertion has been made 
because the IRAP demands relational responses that contradict the induced response bias on 
at least as many discrete trials as it took to engineer it. Indeed, in my Experiments 1 and 2b it 
was possible for a participant to be exposed to a greater number of inconsistent trials in the 
testing IRAP than the number of trials they took to acquire the initial rule in the training 
procedure. This discrepancy occurred whenever a participant only required one or two 
training blocks to meet the response criteria in the contingency-learning and combined-
learning conditions. The results of Experiment 2a suggest that the response biases that had 
persisted over five days weakened through exposure to the testing IRAP; furthermore, even 
though the participants had just been presented with a training procedure, Experiment 2b saw 
at least one reversal in the expected response bias and a low level of differential responding 
overall. Accordingly, there may be a need to regulate (or even increase) the amount of 
training each participant gets before they are presented with the competing contingencies of 
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the testing IRAP (Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2011). 
Some mention should be made of the differential responding that occurred during 
trials in which the participants had to affirm the proposed stimulus relation and the trials in 
which the participants had to negate the stimulus relation that was presented to them. Hughes 
and Barnes (2011) analysed the results of their study in these terms and found that 
affirmation trials produced a much larger ‘IRAP effect’ than negation trials. There was no 
significant difference between the amount of differential responding by trial type in my 
Experiments 1 and 2a. However, the results of Experiment 2b indicate there was a significant 
effect for trial type, with a relatively large ‘IRAP effect’ in the affirmation trials and a slight 
reverse ‘effect’ for negation trials. This outcome suggests that, in the final testing IRAP, the 
participants were quicker to affirm a stated relation (i.e., confirm that the sample and target 
stimuli were indeed “Similar”) on consistent trial blocks than on inconsistent trial blocks and 
slightly quicker to negate a stated relation (i.e., confirm that the sample and target stimuli 
were indeed “Opposite”) on inconsistent trials blocks than on consistent trial blocks. As 
Hughes and Barnes-Holmes (2011) assert, a possible explanation for this secondary response 
bias is that frames of co-ordination occur more often within everyday language and cognition 
than frames of opposition. Accordingly, a participant using the IRAP is able to state that 
something is “Similar” to something else quicker than the time it takes them to state that 
something is “Opposite” to something else. Yet whether this particular response bias is 
mitigated by practice is unknown at this stage. 
A possible limitation of this research concerns the intermittent use of a written script 
during the testing and training components of the experiment. As became apparent within the 
first experimental session, the IRAP is a procedure that places a high demand on participants 
to respond in an entirely prescribed way, a dynamic which creates a certain urgency for 
participants to emit correct responses over many discrete trials. Accordingly, and in order to 
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support some of the participants to meet the response criteria, it was necessary to offer further 
feedback beyond that offered by the IRAP (such as recommending to a participant that they 
respond slower in order to improve their accuracy). Whether this was a limitation to the 
written instructions or the instructions that were presented on-screen is not known as no 
feedback was sought from the participants. However, given the results of McKenna et al.’s 
(2007) study, it is unlikely that any minor deviations from the experimental script 
significantly influenced the participants’ differential responding in my three experiments. 
One further limitation regards the written narrative that was used in the verbal-
instruction and combined-learning conditions of Experiments 1 and 2. An oversight in the 
development of the narrative meant that it contained one sample stimulus six times and the 
other sample stimulus seven times. Accordingly, in the training components of the two 
conditions featuring the written narrative there was one more opportunity for the participants 
to learn the verbal rule associated with the first sample stimulus than for them to learn the 
verbal rule associated with the second; furthermore, this disparity occurred a second time 
within the training component of Experiment 2. Although no analysis was conducted, it is 
possible that this variance in sample presentation affected the participants’ responding. 
Finally, a mention should be made of the limitations of the meaningfulness scale used 
in Experiment 1. This self-report measure produced predominantly low scores with only 36% 
of the participants rating the meaningfulness of their attitudes towards the words “Cug” and 
“Vek” at or above the midpoint of the scale. There may be several reasons for why the 
participants offered such low scores. For example, some of the participants may have been 
uncertain about what it meant for something to be ‘meaningful’ and so offered a low score in 
place of a true appraisal. Furthermore, the instructions on how to complete the scale may 
have been misleading or even inadequate. These issues aside, it is possible that a participant’s 
perceived meaningfulness of the words “Cug” and “Vek” was influenced by whether or not 
 90 
 
they had come into contact with the sample stimuli in an ‘enriched’ context (as occurred 
within the written narrative, for example). Furthermore, the presence of the words “Cug” and 
“Vek” in the written narrative appeared to instil additional ‘meaning’ to the sample stimuli 
when the training IRAP was also used, an effect that can be explained by RFT and the REC 
model (Hayes et al., 2001; Hughes et al., 2012; Hughes & Barnes-Holmes, 2013). Indeed, the 
highest meaningfulness scores were given by the participants who had read the written 
narrative and completed the training IRAP. Accordingly, it is possible that, in order to make 
engineered response biases strong, persistent, and ‘meaningful’, an ‘enriched’ context should 
be used alongside the IRAP whenever it is possible to do so. 
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Appendix A 
 
The information sheet that was emailed to individuals who expressed an interest in the research 
project and presented to each participant (along with the consent form) before they began 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
A Replication and Extension of Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s 
(2011) Study of Induced Implicit Attitudes 
Information Sheet 
 
My name is Douglas Harvey and I am currently enrolled on the Masters of Applied Psychology 
(Applied Behaviour Analysis) course at the University of Waikato. It is my pleasure to invite 
you to participate in my replication and extension of an earlier experiment which tested 
engineered implicit attitudes using a novel, computer-based assessment tool. 
 
The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) is a computer-based assessment tool 
that has been used extensively to measure pre-existing implicit attitudes (understood in this 
context as being implicit relational responding) which have been acquired through historical 
learning processes. However, until Hughes and Barnes-Holmes’s (2011, p. 391) experiment on 
the “formation and persistence of implicit attitudes”, there had been no research in which the 
IRAP was used to measure implicit attitudes that had been engineered in a laboratory. This 
study intends to recreate the earlier experiment while also extending it to see if the engineered 
responses persist over several days. As a further extension of the original study, this research 
will see whether implicit attitudes that have been weakened by the passing time can be 
strengthened through further training. 
 
As an undergraduate, your participation may allow you to receive up to 2% of course credit (if 
available to you); those participants who attend both sessions and who do not wish to receive 
course credit can opt to go into the draw to win one of four Warehouse vouchers instead. 
 
As a participant you will be asked to: 
 
 Attend two experimental sessions spaced five days apart. 
 In the first experimental session you will learn a series of verbal stimulus relations 
through either direct contingency learning using the IRAP, through the use of a written 
narrative, or through the combined use of both methods. Depending on which 
experimental condition you are in you may then be asked to complete two short written 
‘memory checks’. Finally, all participants will undergo a testing IRAP and be asked to 
complete three brief self-report measures. 
 The second experimental session will require you to take an identical testing IRAP 
before being exposed to the same training procedure you underwent in the first session. 
You will then take a final testing IRAP thus completing your participation in the study. 
As a participant your data will remain anonymous: 
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 After the final experimental session any of the contact details used to schedule the time 
and date of your participation will be safely discarded along with your name and any 
other identifying information. 
 Upon arrival at the computer lab you will be given a participant identifier – this 
identifier will be attached to your data report with no other form of identification being 
used. 
 Consent forms and data sheets will be kept in a locked cabinet at the researcher’s office 
for a period of three years – they will then be securely destroyed. 
As a participant your involvement is totally voluntary: 
 
 You may withdraw from this experiment at any time. 
 There is no academic requirement (or otherwise) for you to participate in this study. 
If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this research please contact either the 
researcher, Douglas Harvey, or his supervisor, Dr Rebecca Sargisson. 
 
Researcher: Douglas Harvey 
         School of Psychology, University of Waikato 
         dmh45@students.waikato.ac.nz 
         021 273 3309 
Supervisor: Dr Rebecca Sargisson 
         School of Psychology, University of Waikato 
         rebeccas@waikato.ac.nz         
 
This research project has been approved by the School of Psychology Research and Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Waikato. Any questions 
about the ethical conduct of this research may be sent to the convenor of the Research and 
Ethics Committee (currently Dr James McEwan, phone 07 838 4466 ext. 8295, email: 
jmcewan@waikato.ac.nz) 
 
Reference: 
Hughes, S., & Barnes-Holmes, D. (2011). On the formation and persistence of implicit 
attitudes: New evidence from the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP). The 
Psychological Record, 61, 291-410. 
 
Micro-Glossary 
 
Implicit Attitude: A way of responding to something in a positive or negative way that may be 
automatic – you may even be unaware that you hold an implicit attitude towards something. 
 
Implicit Relational Responding: A behaviour-analytic term for responding to something in a 
positive or negative way (in other words, having an implicit attitude). In the world of behaviour 
analysis, an implicit attitude is a type of behaviour in and of itself. 
 
Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure: The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure 
(IRAP) is a computer-based measure of implicit attitudes – or in behaviour-analytic terms, 
implicit relational responding – which records how long participants take to respond to 
meaningful textual stimuli presented on-screen. The IRAP programme can be used to test both 
pre-existing attitudes and to train new implicit responses. 
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Appendix B 
 
An extract of the experimenter’s script for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 with the 
combined-learning condition offered as an example. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
For all participants (regardless of condition), when the participant arrives, greet them, 
introduce yourself, and then ask them what their name is. Check the timetable to determine the 
participant’s experimental condition and to confirm their details, give the participant their 
identity card, pick up a consent form and the written instructions for the participant’s 
condition, and then ask the participant to sit in front of the laptop. Advise the participant that 
they are about to receive a consent form and an information sheet and that they have no time 
limit in which to read and sign the consent form. If the participant has signed the form place 
the written instructions for their condition in front of them and take the consent form. If they 
are not willing to sign the form, thank them for their attendance and remove all materials from 
the desk. For those participants continuing with the experiment, load the particular IRAP 
programme they will use on the laptop and present any written materials to them with the 
verbal instruction that they should summon the experimenter if they need any further 
assistance. 
The written instructions for each condition are as follows (less the condition titles, the 
experimenter’s dialogue, and the experimenter’s instructions): 
 
Combined-Learning Condition 
 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO READ A WRITTEN NARRATIVE. PLEASE ATTEND TO WHAT IS PRESENTED IN 
THE NARRATIVE AS YOU WILL BE TESTED ON THIS AT A LATER POINT IN THE EXPERIMENT. 
The participant should then read the narrative. They will then be prompted to turn the page 
and complete several tasks. 
THANK YOU FOR READING THE NARRATIVE AND COMPLETING THE TWO ACCOMPANYING TASKS. 
PLEASE SUMMON THE EXPERIMENTER. 
Check the participant’s responses to the memory checks. If their answers are not consistent 
with what they have been exposed to, provide the participant with another memory-check 
question sheet and ask them to re-read the narrative before answering the questions for a 
second time. If the participant is still not answering in a consistent way then they should be 
thanked for their involvement in the experiment and told that their participation has ended. 
Any remaining participants should then turn the page of their written instructions. 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE A COMPUTER-BASED LEARNING TASK WHICH INVOLVES READING 
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COMBINATIONS OF TWO WORDS THAT ARE PRESENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ON THE SCREEN. YOUR 
TASK IS TO STATE WHETHER THE WORDS ARE SIMILAR IN MEANING OR OPPOSITE.  
FOR EACH TRIAL YOU WILL NEED TO LOOK AT THE WORD AT THE TOP OF THE SCREEN, THE WORD 
PRESENTED BELOW IT, AND THEN THE WORDS “SIMILAR” AND “OPPOSITE” WHICH WILL BE 
PRESENTED HORIZONTALLY AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCREEN. USING EITHER THE “D” KEY OR THE 
“K” KEY YOU MUST THEN CHOOSE ONE OF THE TWO WORDS (OR RESPONSE OPTIONS) THAT ARE 
PRESENTED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCREEN. 
WHEN MAKING YOUR RESPONSE, USE EITHER THE INDEX OR MIDDLE FINGER OF YOUR LEFT HAND 
TO PRESS THE “D” KEY AND EITHER THE INDEX OR MIDDLE FINGER OF YOUR RIGHT HAND TO PRESS 
THE “K” KEY.  
THE RESPONSE OPTIONS “SIMILAR” AND “OPPOSITE” WILL NOT REMAIN IN THE SAME PLACE OF 
THE SCREEN FOR EACH TRIAL: THESE WORDS WILL SWAP PLACES IN A WAY THAT CANNOT BE 
PREDICTED. 
IN ORDER FOR YOU TO RELATE THE VARIOUS WORDS PRESENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOVE THE 
TWO RESPONSE-WORDS THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME WILL PROVIDE FEEDBACK BY TELLING YOU 
IF YOU HAVE MADE A CORRECT OR INCORRECT RESPONSE. AN INCORRECT RESPONSE IS 
INDICATED BY THE PRESENTATION OF A RED CROSS. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU MAKE FEW ERRORS AND RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. TO 
DO THIS, TRY TO FOCUS ON ACCURATE RESPONDING FIRST AND FOREMOST; WHEN YOU ARE 
GIVING A CORRECT RESPONSE IN THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIALS, TRY TO SPEED UP YOUR 
RESPONDING UNTIL YOU TAKING AS LITTLE TIME TO RELATE THE WORDS AS POSSIBLE. 
GO WELL! 
PLEASE PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE WITH THE LEARNING TASK AND SUMMON THE 
EXPERIMENTER WHEN PROMPTED TO DO SO. 
When the participant summons you (having finished the training IRAP), load the testing IRAP 
and advise the participant to turn to the next page of the written instructions: 
“Thank you for completing the training task. Please read the next page of instructions.”   
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE A COMPUTER-BASED TEST THAT IS SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO THE 
COMPUTER-BASED LEARNING TASK THAT YOU TOOK EARLIER. 
AS BEFORE, THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME WILL ASK YOU TO FOLLOW A SERIES OF RULES WHICH 
WILL BECOME APPARENT THROUGH THE FEEDBACK THAT IS GIVEN FOLLOWING EACH INCORRECT 
RESPONSE. 
AT SOME POINTS IN THE FOLLOWING TEST THE FEEDBACK PROVIDED WILL MAKE SENSE TO YOU; 
AT OTHER POINTS, THE FEEDBACK WILL CONTRADICT WHAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY LEARNT. 
THIS IS PART OF THE TASK AND YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND IN DIFFERENT WAYS. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU MAKE FEW ERRORS AND RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. TO 
DO THIS, TRY TO FOCUS ON ACCURATE RESPONDING FIRST AND FOREMOST; WHEN YOU ARE 
GIVING A CORRECT RESPONSE ON THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIALS, TRY TO SPEED UP YOUR 
RESPONDING UNTIL YOU TAKING AS LITTLE TIME TO RELATE THE WORDS AS POSSIBLE. 
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GO WELL! 
PLEASE PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE WITH THE TEST AND SUMMON THE EXPERIMENTER 
WHEN PROMPTED TO DO SO. 
When the participant summons you, say the following: 
“Thank you for completing the test. Please turn the page and complete the three self-report 
measures and let me know when you are finished.”  
When the participant has finished the self-report measures, take the instruction booklet, thank 
the participant, and confirm the time of their next attendance. 
 
Extension Experiment 
 
For all participants (regardless of condition), when the participant arrives, greet them, re-
introduce yourself, and then ask them for their identity card (or if they do not have it with them 
ask them what their name is). Check the timetable to determine the participant’s experimental 
condition and to re-confirm their details, pick up the written instructions for the participant’s 
condition, and then ask the participant to sit in front of the laptop. Load the IRAP programme 
the participant will use on the laptop and present any written materials to them with the verbal 
instruction that they should summon the experimenter if they need any further assistance. 
The written instructions for each condition are as follows (less the condition titles, the 
experiment’s dialogue, and the experimenter’s instructions): 
 
Combined-Learning Condition 
 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE A COMPUTER-BASED TEST THAT IS SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO THE 
COMPUTER-BASED TEST THAT YOU TOOK AT THE EARLIER EXPERIMENTAL SESSION. 
AS BEFORE, THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME WILL ASK YOU TO FOLLOW A SERIES OF RULES WHICH 
WILL BECOME APPARENT THROUGH THE FEEDBACK THAT IS GIVEN FOLLOWING EACH INCORRECT 
RESPONSE. 
AT SOME POINTS IN THE FOLLOWING TEST THE FEEDBACK PROVIDED WILL MAKE SENSE TO YOU; 
AT OTHER POINTS, THE FEEDBACK WILL CONTRADICT WHAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY LEARNT. 
THIS IS PART OF THE TASK AND YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND IN DIFFERENT WAYS. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU MAKE FEW ERRORS AND RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. TO 
DO THIS, TRY TO FOCUS ON ACCURATE RESPONDING FIRST AND FOREMOST; WHEN YOU ARE 
GIVING A CORRECT RESPONSE IN THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIALS, TRY TO SPEED UP YOUR 
RESPONDING UNTIL YOU TAKING AS LITTLE TIME TO RELATE THE WORDS AS POSSIBLE. 
GO WELL! 
PLEASE PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE WITH THE TEST AND SUMMON THE EXPERIMENTER 
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WHEN PROMPTED TO DO SO. 
When the participant summons you, say the following: 
“Thank you for completing the test. Please turn the page of the written instructions and read 
them while I load the next programme.”  
While the participant is reading the written instructions, load whichever testing programme 
the participant is to take. 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO READ A WRITTEN NARRATIVE. PLEASE ATTEND TO WHAT IS PRESENTED IN 
THE NARRATIVE AS YOU WILL BE TESTED ON THIS AT A LATER POINT IN THE EXPERIMENT. 
The participant should then read the narrative. They will then be prompted to turn the page 
and complete several tasks. 
THANK YOU FOR READING THE NARRATIVE AND COMPLETING THE TWO ACCOMPANYING TASKS. 
PLEASE SUMMON THE EXPERIMENTER. 
Check the participant’s responses to the memory checks. If their answers are not consistent 
with what they have been exposed to, provide the participant with another memory-check 
question sheet and ask them to re-read the narrative before answering the questions for a 
second time. If the participant is still not answering in a consistent way then they should be 
thanked for their involvement in the experiment and told that their participation has ended. 
Any remaining participants should then turn the page of their written instructions. 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE A COMPUTER-BASED LEARNING TASK WHICH INVOLVES READING 
COMBINATIONS OF TWO WORDS THAT ARE PRESENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ON THE SCREEN. YOUR 
TASK IS TO STATE WHETHER THE WORDS ARE SIMILAR IN MEANING OR OPPOSITE.  
FOR EACH TRIAL YOU WILL NEED TO LOOK AT THE WORD AT THE TOP OF THE SCREEN, THE WORD 
PRESENTED BELOW IT, AND THEN THE WORDS “SIMILAR” AND “OPPOSITE” WHICH WILL BE 
PRESENTED HORIZONTALLY AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCREEN. USING EITHER THE “D” KEY OR THE 
“K” KEY YOU MUST THEN CHOOSE ONE OF THE TWO WORDS (OR RESPONSE OPTIONS) THAT ARE 
PRESENTED AT THE BOTTOM OF THE SCREEN. 
WHEN MAKING YOUR RESPONSE, USE EITHER THE INDEX OR MIDDLE FINGER OF YOUR LEFT HAND 
TO PRESS THE “D” KEY AND EITHER THE INDEX OR MIDDLE FINGER OF YOUR RIGHT HAND TO PRESS 
THE “K” KEY.  
THE RESPONSE OPTIONS “SIMILAR” AND “OPPOSITE” WILL NOT REMAIN IN THE SAME PLACE OF 
THE SCREEN FOR EACH TRIAL: THESE WORDS WILL SWAP PLACES IN A WAY THAT CANNOT BE 
PREDICTED. 
IN ORDER FOR YOU TO RELATE THE VARIOUS WORDS PRESENTED SIMULTANEOUSLY ABOVE THE 
TWO RESPONSE-WORDS THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME WILL PROVIDE FEEDBACK BY TELLING YOU 
IF YOU HAVE MADE A CORRECT OR INCORRECT RESPONSE. AN INCORRECT RESPONSE IS 
INDICATED BY THE PRESENTATION OF A RED CROSS. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU MAKE FEW ERRORS AND RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. TO 
DO THIS, TRY TO FOCUS ON ACCURATE RESPONDING FIRST AND FOREMOST; WHEN YOU ARE 
GIVING A CORRECT RESPONSE IN THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIALS, TRY TO SPEED UP YOUR 
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RESPONDING UNTIL YOU TAKING AS LITTLE TIME TO RELATE THE WORDS AS POSSIBLE. 
GO WELL! 
PLEASE PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE WITH THE LEARNING TASK AND SUMMON THE 
EXPERIMENTER WHEN PROMPTED TO DO SO. 
When the participant summons you (having finished the training IRAP), load the testing IRAP 
and advise the participant to turn to the next page of the written instructions: 
“Thank you for completing the training task. Please read the next page of instructions.” 
YOU ARE ABOUT TO TAKE A COMPUTER-BASED TEST THAT IS SIMILAR IN APPEARANCE TO THE 
COMPUTER-BASED LEARNING TASK THAT YOU TOOK EARLIER. 
AS BEFORE, THE COMPUTER PROGRAMME WILL ASK YOU TO FOLLOW A SERIES OF RULES WHICH 
WILL BECOME APPARENT THROUGH THE FEEDBACK THAT IS GIVEN FOLLOWING EACH INCORRECT 
RESPONSE. 
AT SOME POINTS IN THE FOLLOWING TEST THE FEEDBACK PROVIDED WILL MAKE SENSE TO YOU; 
AT OTHER POINTS, THE FEEDBACK WILL CONTRADICT WHAT YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY LEARNT. 
THIS IS PART OF THE TASK AND YOU WILL BE REQUIRED TO RESPOND IN DIFFERENT WAYS. 
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU MAKE FEW ERRORS AND RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU CAN. TO 
DO THIS, TRY TO FOCUS ON ACCURATE RESPONDING FIRST AND FOREMOST; WHEN YOU ARE 
GIVING A CORRECT RESPONSE IN THE MAJORITY OF THE TRIALS, TRY TO SPEED UP YOUR 
RESPONDING UNTIL YOU TAKING AS LITTLE TIME TO RELATE THE WORDS AS POSSIBLE. 
GO WELL! 
PLEASE PRESS THE SPACE BAR TO CONTINUE WITH THE TEST AND SUMMON THE EXPERIMENTER 
WHEN PROMPTED TO DO SO. 
When the participant summons you, thank the participant for their involvement and provide 
them with a lottery ticket if they have opted to receive one. 
